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FOR RATING AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY*
JEFFREY MANNS**
This Article argues that an absence of accountability and
interconnections of interest between rating agencies and their
debt-issuer clients fostered a system of lax ratings that provided
false assurances on the risks posed by subprime mortgagebacked securities and collateralized debt obligations. It lays out
an innovative, yet practical pathway for reform by suggesting
how debt purchasers—the primary beneficiaries of ratings—may
bear both the burdens and benefits of rating agency
accountability by financing ratings through a Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”)-administered user fee system in
exchange for enforceable rights. The SEC user fee system would
require rating agencies both to bid for the right to rate debt issues
and to assume certification and mandatory reporting duties to
creditors. The Article suggests that empowering creditors to seek
capped damages against rating agencies for gross negligence,
while reserving enforcement discretion with the SEC to pursue
negligence actions, would create incentives for rating agency
compliance, yet pose a manageable burden.
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INTRODUCTION
The subprime mortgage crisis has sparked scrutiny about how
rating agencies—the gatekeepers of credit risk—compromised their
duties by failing to ring warning bells about a bubble market.1 A host
of private actors also shoulder blame for excessive risk taking and
deception. For example, mortgage brokers granted millions of
adjustable rate mortgages to high-risk borrowers; commercial and
investment banks issued trillions of dollars of subprime residential
mortgage backed securities (“RMBS”) and collateralized debt
obligations (“CDOs”) that camouflaged the actual risks;2 and
1. See, e.g., Allen Ferrell et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from
the 2007–2008 Credit Crisis 37–53 (Harvard Law Sch., Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion
Paper Series, Paper No. 612, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582
(discussing the legal issues surrounding the extensive subprime litigation, such as Rule
10b-5 actions against banks, ERISA litigation, and litigation against rating agencies); cf.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS.
LAW. 1403, 1408–09 (2002) (arguing that “the collective failure of the gatekeepers” lay at
the heart of the accounting scandals); Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer
Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 403–07 (2003) (arguing that securities gatekeepers fail the
public by not adequately screening for corporate wrongdoing).
2. RMBS and mortgage-based CDOs are debt obligations based on large pools of
mortgage loans whose cash flows are based on principal and interest payments from the
underlying mortgages. Approximately $1.7 trillion worth of subprime RMBS were issued
from 2001 to 2006. See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the
Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit 2 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No.
07-43, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071189. The dollar values of subprime
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purchasers of these instruments relied excessively on ratings3 as
proxies for risk.4
What distinguishes the culpability of rating agencies from that
of other private actors is that federal and state statutes and
regulations deputized rating agencies as gatekeepers by formally
recognizing their public role5 and mandating that issuers meet rating
thresholds to sell debt in a myriad of markets, such as to money
market or pension funds.6 This Article focuses on how an absence of
accountability and interconnections of interest between rating
agencies and their clients, issuers of debt, led rating agencies to
abrogate their responsibilities as screeners of credit risk. As a result,
rating agencies failed to nip the bubble market of subprime debt in
the bud. Ratings agencies not only did not identify risks to particular
issuers and credit markets as a whole at an early stage, but also did
not condition investment-grade ratings on higher levels of diligence

CDOs are harder to pinpoint because of less transparency, but JP Morgan has estimated
that over $600 billion in subprime CDOs were issued over this period. See Jenny
Anderson & Heather Timmons, Why a U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis is Felt Around the
World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C1.
3. Credit ratings serve to indicate relative gradations of risk for credit instruments
such as bonds and derivatives. Each rating agency has its own distinctive methodology for
making risk assessments and employs their own set of letters and additional signals for
indicating the extent and nature of credit risks. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
619, 620, 648 n.139 (1999); infra Part II.A.
4. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, If Everyone’s Fingerpointing, Who’s to Blame?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2008, at C1 (discussing the myriad of suits and countersuits filed among the parties
involved in the subprime mortgage crisis); Stuart M. Turnbull et al., The Subprime Credit
Crisis of 07, at 8–19 (July 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112467 (discussing the array of market participants who have
potential culpability for the subprime mortgage crisis).
5. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327, 1327–29 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, and 23 U.S.C.) (laying out the
process for rating agencies to be certified as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization (“NRSRO”)).
6. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(c)(1)(i)(A) (2008) (mandating
ongoing NRSRO ratings for issuers making filings under the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit
Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 8236, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,972, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,066, 68 Fed. Reg.
35,258, 35,258 (June 12, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release] (discussing how since
1975 the SEC “has relied on credit ratings from market-recognized credible rating
agencies for distinguishing among grades of creditworthiness in various regulations under
the Federal securities laws”); Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Selected Principles for
the Regulation of Investments by Insurance Companies and Pension Funds, 75 FIN.
MARKET TRENDS 117, 120 (2000) (noting the ratings requirements for money market
funds, insurers, and pension funds to purchase debt securities).
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and disclosures by issuers.7 This Article lays out an innovative, yet
practical pathway to reform by proposing the creation of an SECadministered user fee system that will enlist the purchasers of
corporate debt—the primary beneficiaries of credit risk
assessments—as self-interested monitors of rating agencies and
complements to SEC oversight.8
This Article argues that the challenges of rating agency
accountability reflect an inherent conflict posed by interconnections
of interest between ratings agencies and their commercial clients and
the disconnect between ratings agencies and beneficiaries of their
screening roles.9 The sole legal and financial relationship that ratings
agencies face is with issuers of debt who benefited from systematically
lax ratings on subprime debt instruments.10 In contrast, purchasers of
debt, who relied on ratings as proxies of risk in purchasing RMBS and

7. A broad literature has explored enlisting private gatekeepers to perform public
enforcement functions. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2004) (describing
a gatekeeper as a “reputational intermediary” who “receives only a limited payoff from
any involvement in misconduct” compared to the primary wrongdoer); Assaf Hamdani,
Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63 (2003) (defining gatekeepers as parties who
“offer a service or sell a product that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular
market or engage in certain activities”); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer:
Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1019, 1050–54 (1993) (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide indispensable, or at
least extremely useful, services to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring
capacities, and who cannot easily be replaced by wrongdoers); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986)
(defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). This Article understands gatekeepers
as private actors whose role as suppliers or consumers of lawful goods or services provides
them with the cost-effective ability to detect and potentially prevent wrongdoing.
8. Numerous academics have chronicled the SEC’s shortcomings as a regulator,
which arguably contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi &
A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21–36, 40–41
(2003) (discussing the behavioral biases within the SEC that limit the agency’s efficacy as a
regulator); John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea? 30 (Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 342, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309776 (arguing that “the SEC was an ineffective monitor of
leverage and risk management policies at financial institutions under its jurisdictions”
from at least 1990 through the subprime mortgage crisis). In spite of the SEC’s
shortcomings, this Article seeks to enlist the SEC (or a subsidiary agency or division) as
the administrator of the user fee system, because the SEC already oversees rating agencies
and therefore has relevant experience to build on in implementing expanded
responsibilities. See generally Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 10929, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, and 23 U.S.C.) (bolstering
SEC regulation of credit rating agencies).
9. See infra Parts II.C–D.
10. See infra Parts II.B–C.
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CDOs, have neither a role in the ratings process nor any means to
hold rating agencies accountable for their failures.11
The Securities and Exchange Commission has recognized the
shortcomings of rating agencies.12 But instead of tackling the
challenges of rating agency accountability, the SEC has embraced a
policy of caveat emptor for risk management by proposing new rules
that would scale back requirements for issuers to secure ratings in
order “to reduce undue reliance on credit ratings.”13 The SEC’s
proposal ironically ignores the virtues of centralized risk management
at a time when the current crisis has underscored the significance of
the detection and preemption of excessive risk taking in financial
markets.14
11. See Yalman Onaran, Banks’ Subprime Losses Top $500 Billion on Writedowns,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=a8sW0n1Cs1tY (discussing the over $500 billion in writedowns and credit
losses from the subprime mortgage crisis).
12. The SEC has recently proposed modest changes that seek to increase
transparency in the ratings process and to curb some of the most abusive rating agency
practices that fueled the subprime mortgage crisis. Proposed Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed.
Reg. 36,212 (June 19, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf; SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF
ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES 4–5 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/
craexamination070808.pdf.
13. References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-58070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088, 40,088 (July 1, 2008) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
2008/34-58070.pdf (proposing the removal of some formal requirements for NRSRO
ratings within rule and form requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Exchange Act). The SEC has proposed deemphasizing the significance of rating agencies
by formally removing the requirement of NRSRO ratings in a variety of contexts. The
premise of these changes is to make it clear that investors should not “place undue
reliance on the credit ratings.” Id. at 40,089. The emphasis is on the word “undue” as
regardless of whether these proposed rules are implemented the problem of rating agency
accountability will still exist. Entrenched market practices of soliciting and relying upon
ratings are likely to sustain the importance of ratings. Id.; see also References to Ratings
of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Investment Company Act
Release No. 28,327, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124, 40,124–42 (July 12, 2008) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 270 and 275), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/ic-28327.pdf
(proposing the removal of some formal requirements for NRSRO ratings under rules
pursuant to the Investment Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Security
Ratings, Exchange Act Release No. 8940, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106, 40,106–24 (July 11, 2008)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239, 240), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/2008/33-8940.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2008 Proposed Rules] (proposing to
change rating requirements for money market funds and investment companies, as well as
for registered asset-backed securities).
14. To date, the SEC has shied away from removing requirements for NRSRO ratings
and has chosen not to implement this proposal. Instead, the SEC has opted to implement
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This Article suggests how debt purchasers may shoulder both the
burdens and benefits of gatekeeper accountability by financing an
SEC-administered user fee system as a quid pro quo for enforceable
rights, yet shows how caps on liability and other safeguards would
make gatekeepers’ duties manageable.15 This Article suggests how
the SEC would use the proceeds of a user fee imposed on debt
purchasers to finance a bidding process in which rating agencies
would compete to rate debt issues.16
Price competition among
its more modest proposed rules designed to reduce conflicts of interest and to heighten
transparency of rating agencies’ methodologies. See SEC Issues Rules on Conflicts in
Credit Rating, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/business/
economy/04sec.html.
15. Other authors have recognized the shortcomings of rating agencies as
gatekeepers. However, this Article is the first to make the case for a user fee approach
that seeks to heighten accountability by shifting rating agency duties from issuers to
creditors. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43,
82–93 (2004) (advocating reduced barriers to entry to encourage new entrants into the
ratings industry and arguing against greater government oversight of rating agencies);
Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 10, 24 (2006) (arguing “that credit rating agencies simultaneously enjoy great
success while providing no information of value to the investing public” because “the SEC
inadvertently created an artificial regulatory demand for the services of a small number of
favored rating agencies when it misguidedly invented the NRSRO designation”); Frank
Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 74–79 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (emphasizing
the government’s role in making rating agencies central actors in the securities process and
arguing that rating agencies do not serve as effective gatekeepers of credit risk); David
Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to
Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 989–91 (2006)
(discussing how rating agencies’ lax approach fueled each stage of the subprime mortgage
crisis and arguing for greater SEC oversight); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of
Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12–21 (arguing that
additional regulation of rating agencies by the SEC is unnecessary and probably inefficient
because it poses risks of political manipulation); Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner,
Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed
Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 34–47 (May 3, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475 (discussing the
shortcomings of ratings in failing to reflect the risks of subprime debt instruments).
16. The logic of government-administered user fee systems is straightforward as it
constitutes a quid pro quo in which payment of a user fee reflects receipt of a valued
service. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 800–12 (1987) (discussing the rationale for
creating user fees that facilitate economically efficient allocation of goods and services);
Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the Get What You Pay For Model of
Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 381–82 (2004) (describing the broad range of
functions in which governments employ user fees to fund and allocate resources to users
who value the services the most); Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion,
38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 343–51 (2003) (discussing the types of considerations that go into
decisions to impose user fees rather than taxes). One alternative to a user fee system to
finance gatekeepers would be to impose direct levies on corporations to fund voucher
systems under which shareholders individually direct funding to their preferred
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bidding rating agencies would be designed both to contain costs and
to reduce barriers to entry into the highly concentrated ratings
market by leveling the playing field for smaller competitors and new
entrants. As importantly, the SEC would also require bidding rating
agencies to detail the type and extent of diligence that they would
commit to undertake (and/or to impose on issuers), and the SEC
would enjoy discretion to condition bids on rating agencies meeting
diligence thresholds. The user fee system would serve to create
ongoing channels for the SEC and debt purchasers to shape the focus
of rating agencies’ efforts by bringing risk-related concerns to the
attention of rating agencies.
The combination of a user fee system with the creation of rating
agency duties to creditors would provide creditors with incentives to
hold rating agencies accountable.17
This Article delineates
certification and mandatory reporting duties for rating agencies that
would expand and formalize the role of rating agencies as screeners of
issuers’ disclosures and as the backstop for auditor and lawyer
gatekeeping duties.18 It suggests how limiting liability to creditors to
cases of gross negligence, coupled with an earnings-based cap on
liability exposure, will constitute a manageable burden for rating

intermediaries such as securities analysts and proxy advisory services to facilitate
shareholder activism. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A
Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 317–23
(2003). As this Article will discuss in detail, the virtue of utilizing a user fee approach as a
quid pro quo for enforceable rights against gatekeepers is that beneficiaries would directly
internalize the burdens and benefits of gatekeeping and therefore have the clear selfinterest in overseeing gatekeeping roles and holding gatekeepers accountable.
17. One temptation policymakers may face is the illusory appeal of creating a
government entity that would assume the risk assessment role of private rating agencies.
The public dimensions of rating agencies’ screening role might make it seem logical to vest
this role in a federal agency. However, a public rating agency would be exposed to
significant risks of public capture by issuers. A case in point would be the downgrades of
automobile companies’ debt. While private rating agencies could exercise autonomy to
issue downgrades, a public rating agency would likely face tremendous pressure from
politicians not to downgrade automobile companies’ debt for fear of jeopardizing their
constituents’ jobs. High-profile instances of capture could swiftly undermine a public
rating agency’s credibility. As importantly, private rating agencies serve an important
political cover role as the threat of debt downgrades by private rating agencies gave
politicians’ stronger arguments for a multi-billion dollar bailout for automobile companies.
See Bill Vlasic, G.M., Teetering on Bankruptcy, Pleads for a Federal Bailout, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2008, at B1 (noting how rating agency downgrades gave greater urgency to GM’s
pleas for a federal bailout).
18. Rating agencies’ duties could be framed as a product of creditors’ contractual
privity with the rating agencies under this Article’s proposed user fee system or as the
creation of a regulation or statute. Either means would advance the same end of crafting a
new relationship of rating agency accountability to creditors. See infra Part IV.A.
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agencies.19 Lastly, to ensure that this approach does not replace one
problem with another by skewing incentives too much in favor of debt
purchasers, this Article suggests empowering the SEC with exclusive
enforcement discretion to pursue actions for informal sanctions in
cases of rating agency negligence.20
Parts I and II of this Article discuss the role that beneficiaries of
screening roles may play in holding rating agencies accountable and
highlight the absence of effective oversight of rating agencies under
the current system. Parts III and IV lay out the contours of the user
fee system and the related duties rating agencies would face and
suggest how this approach would empower the SEC and creditors to
serve as monitors of rating agency compliance.
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR BENEFICIARIES TO HEIGHTEN
GATEKEEPER ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Potential and Challenges of Gatekeepers
1. The Appeal of Enlisting Gatekeepers
Gatekeepers, such as rating agencies, serve as appealing
substitutes for public enforcement because of their potential to
19. Application of a gross negligence standard would impose liability for rating
agencies’ failures to identify or engage in diligence of risks of such a nature and degree
that the failure constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person’s standard of care.
See, e.g., Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 1990 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,327, at
96,585 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (applying a gross negligence standard gross negligence to
corporate directors to determine whether they have sufficiently informed themselves to
receive deference under the business judgment rule).
20. Concerns about the political viability of this proposal are understandable given
the skepticism that policymakers may have about the ability and willingness of rating
agencies to fulfill their responsibilities. As Congressman Sarbanes argued, “why should
we trust the same people who ignored these warnings to fix the problem in a way that
means it’s not going to happen going forward.” Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial
Crisis: Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 95 (2008)
(statement of Rep. John P. Sarbanes), available at http://www.oversight.house.gov/
documents/20081023162631.pdf [hereinafter Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial
Crisis]. For this reason, this Article’s proposal does not merely seek to add new wine to
old wineskins by focusing solely on reforming the dominant rating agencies. Instead, its
focus is twofold: introducing greater competition by reducing the barriers to entry for
small rating agencies, such as Egan-Jones, and for foreign rating agencies to compete in
the U.S. market; and creating multiple layers of public and private oversight of rating
agencies to ensure that rating agencies face more meaningful accountability. This
roadmap to reform will not satisfy all critics. But it does offer a middle path for
policymakers that avoids the inherent risks from either trusting in rating agencies’
willingness to reform themselves or from removing requirements for ratings and relying on
equally unfounded faith in the efficacy of caveat emptor for debt purchasers.

1020

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

monitor clients cost-effectively for unlawful or deceptive uses of their
goods or services. But as the discussion of the role of rating agencies
in the subprime crisis will underscore, gatekeepers have proven
equally adept at obfuscating client misconduct and subverting statemandated gatekeeping duties in order to retain and expand their
business. Policymakers have faced chronic difficulties in holding
gatekeepers accountable, yet this Section suggests how it is possible to
enlist the beneficiaries of gatekeepers’ screening roles as selfinterested monitors of gatekeepers and complements to public
oversight and accountability.
Gatekeepers served as one of the earliest private enforcement
tools for advancing public objectives as screeners for prospective
wrongdoers at city gates.
The modern analogues of literal
gatekeepers may control “gates” inasmuch as they supply lawful
goods or services that are also essential to perform types of illicit acts
or are functionally necessary because of the high cost or drawbacks of
alternatives.21
What makes gatekeepers a potentially potent
enforcement tool is that they may be positioned to observe clients’
use of their goods or services and to identify and/or prevent illicit or
deceptive use of their services in a cost-effective way. For example,
internet service providers may police against the transmission of child
pornography; doctors may screen against prescription drug abuse, and
securities gatekeepers, such as lawyers, auditors, and rating agencies,
may scrutinize disclosures for evidence of corporate fraud or
excessive risk-taking.22
The defining characteristic of gatekeepers is their dual capacity:
the services they offer may serve lawful ends, or they may enable

21. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (arguing that a defining feature of a
gatekeeper is that the targeted “misconduct cannot occur without the gatekeeper’s
participation”); Kraakman, supra note 7, at 54, 61–63 (arguing that “a specialized good,
service, or form of certification that is essential for the wrongdoing to succeed—is the
‘gate’ that the gatekeeper keeps”).
22. Other gatekeepers may create the demand that attracts prospective wrongdoers,
such as employers whose attempts to depress wage levels may attract underage workers or
undocumented aliens. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of
Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 941–44 (“Employers of low-wage
workers and undocumented aliens share incentives to find ways around the substance of
the verification requirements.”). Similarly, American companies may foster illicit activity
by outsourcing production facilities to firms in developing countries, which
(“unbeknownst” to the American companies) abuse human rights to cut costs or bribe
officials to aid their American clients. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 29–35 (1998) (laying out
the scope of parent-subsidiary liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
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wrongdoers to pursue their illegal activity.23 As a result, policymakers
face an enforcement dilemma. Banning the goods or services at issue
may cut off avenues for potential wrongdoing (or at least raise the
price for wrongdoing by shifting activities underground), yet it comes
at a prohibitive cost to both gatekeepers and their law-abiding clients.
The government, however, may be ill-equipped to screen
gatekeepers’ clients for illicit activity in a more nuanced way due to
limits in oversight capabilities coupled with resource constraints.
Gatekeepers have the potential to resolve this dilemma by
serving as surrogates for public enforcement. Gatekeepers’ roles as
goods or services providers may give them control over “choke
points” that allow them to identify and nip nascent signs of illicit
activity in the bud. The ability to withhold goods or services may
equip gatekeepers with leverage to demand nonpublic information
from users of their services as a condition for access. Gatekeepers’
specialized skills may allow them to process and recognize potential
illicit activity in cost-effective ways.24 In contrast, public enforcers
may lack the ability even to identify prospective wrongdoers, let alone
the capability to process information about potential wrongdoing,
except at prohibitively high economic and social costs.
The obstacles to direct public enforcement of securities law make
the potential of gatekeepers as substitutes for public enforcement
particularly important.25 The enormity of the SEC’s mandate and the
dearth of specialized skills and insider knowledge among SEC
officials may make direct oversight of all but a small percentage of
potential corporate actors practically infeasible and limit the efficacy

23. If gatekeepers merely provided or demanded illegal services, then their
misconduct would fall under accomplice liability or conspiracy to commit criminal acts or
civil wrongs. But the fact that the goods or services gatekeepers demand or supply can be
used either legally or illegally places gatekeepers in a unique position as potential
screeners of wrongdoing, yet makes their culpability more ambiguous.
24. For example, rating agencies may demand insider information as a condition for
issuing or amending a rating, a necessary condition for issuing debt. See Kraakman, supra
note 7, at 61–66 (discussing potential ways that private gatekeepers may complement
public enforcement).
25. The more complex the activity, the more prospective offenders may enjoy an
advantage over enforcers in obfuscating their activities, a fact which creates the need for
gatekeepers. See Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of
Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3–16 (2004); see also Steven L.
Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 2–6, 18–20 (discussing how “the increasingly widespread problem of complexity”
makes it difficult for public enforcers to regulate and oversee “virtually all securitization
and derivatives deals and other forms of structured-financing transactions”).
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of SEC scrutiny even when it can be applied.26 In contrast, the
specialized services supplied by rating agencies, lawyers, and
accountants provide them with systematic opportunities to detect,
prevent, and/or alert the public about risky corporate conduct or
fraud.27
2. The Challenges Posed by Gatekeeper Responsibility Without
Accountability
Securities gatekeepers have long claimed to serve the above
mentioned roles in vouching for the legality and accuracy of their
clients’ actions to governments and private markets.28
Two
interrelated problems, however, make gatekeeping accountability
difficult to sustain: interconnections of interest with clients and
gatekeeper autonomy. An inherent conflict of interest arises from
asking those who seek to serve their customers (and to woo more
business) simultaneously to police their customers. The self-interest
of gatekeepers may provide strong incentives for them to remain
silent in the face of corporate wrongdoing, if not to be willfully
complicit in their clients’ illicit activity.
For example, while fees from a given company may constitute a
small percentage of the revenues of a law firm or accounting firm, a
single client may frequently account for the majority of the revenue
stream for individual lawyers and auditors.29 Incentive structures
26. For example, as of June 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission had a staff
of approximately 3,600 who “are responsible for overseeing over 10,000 publicly traded
companies; over 10,000 investment advisers who manage over $37 trillion in assets; nearly
1,000 fund complexes; 6,000 broker-dealers with 172,000 branches; and the $44 trillion
worth of trading that’s conducted each year on America’s stock and options exchanges.”
Review of Investor Protection and Market Oversight with the Five Commissioners of the
Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services,
110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC).
27. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 308–09 (describing a gatekeeper as a
“reputational intermediary” who “receives only a limited payoff from any involvement in
misconduct” compared to the primary wrongdoer); Hamdani, supra note 7, at 63 (defining
gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service or sell a product that is necessary for clients
wishing to enter a particular market or engage in certain activities”); Jackson, supra note
7, at 1050–54 (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide “indispensable, or at least
extremely useful,” services to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring capacities,
and who cannot easily be replaced by wrongdoers).
28. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 26 (arguing that rating agencies’ “reputational
motivation is sufficient” and that “[a]dditional regulation of rating agencies thus would
impose unnecessary costs and thereby diminish efficiency”).
29. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 322–23 (discussing how auditing firms as a whole may
have a broad set of clients, but arguing that individual auditors who serve a large client
such as Enron effectively have their economic interests interconnected with a single
client).
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within law and accounting firms magnify these interconnections of
interest. Lawyers and auditors are frequently awarded a percentage
of revenues earned from a client if they win the client’s business or
secure additional projects from the client, as well as a percentage of
the revenues earned by other lawyers that they bring in to work for a
given client. The combination of “origination” and “proliferation”
credits that partners receive are designed to intertwine their economic
interests with their firms, yet they also form a web that binds law and
accounting partners more closely to their clients.30
These
interconnections of interest may heighten incentives for outright
collusion, but the larger concern is that lawyers and auditors may face
overwhelming incentives to engage in formalistic compliance with
gatekeeper duties and to stand by as corporate wrongdoing takes
place.
Autonomy has historically served as gatekeepers’ answer to
temptations posed by interconnections of interest with clients.
Gatekeepers such as rating agencies, auditors, and lawyers have long
professed that concerns for their reputations provide robust
incentives for their integrity and accuracy in their screening roles and
eclipse any short-term gains from turning a blind eye to client
misconduct.31 As a result, securities gatekeepers have argued that
autonomy from their clients is an affirmative good that testifies to
their ability to reach independent judgments. Courts have routinely
accepted gatekeepers’ arguments that their reputations are their
business and raised high bars to suits targeting gatekeeper
misconduct.32

30. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 335–39 (1985) (laying out a theory explaining profit sharing
incentives within law firms); William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier
Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1700–03 (2006)
(noting the significance of origination and proliferation credit structures within law firms).
31. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability
Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 312 (1988) (arguing that the reputational costs that
accountants may face from failing to detect wrongdoing provide them with adequate
incentives to monitor their clients); see also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629
(7th Cir. 1990) (arguing that an accountant’s concern for her reputation and exposure to
potential loss would make collusion with her clients’ accounting fraud irrational).
32. See, e.g., Fidel v. Farley, 2004 FED App. 0433P, ¶ 10, 392 F.3d 220, 232 (6th Cir.)
(“[A]llegations that the auditor earned and wished to continue earning fees from a client
do not raise an inference that the auditor acted with the requisite scienter.”); Melder v.
Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that allegation that an auditing firm
would “put its professional reputation on the line by conducting fraudulent auditing work”
in return for “fees for two years’ audits” is irrational).
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Unfortunately, gatekeeper autonomy is an illusory virtue, which
raises a larger problem of the absence of accountability to any public
or private actor. As this Article’s discussion of rating agencies will
highlight, reputational constraints have waned amidst bubble
markets, and broader shifts in the risk-seeking behavior of
participants in financial markets have dampened the force of
reputational constraints.33 In the absence of effective reputational
constraints, gatekeepers may face strong temptations to underinvest
in fulfillment of their duties in order to bolster their profit margins.
Alternatively, gatekeepers may shamelessly leverage their autonomy
in order to extract greater revenues from their clients and tacitly or
willfully abet potential wrongdoers in the process. If the government
or private actors cannot hold autonomous gatekeepers accountable,
gatekeeper independence may amount to nothing more than a shroud
for seeking to extract supranormal profits from clients and
sidestepping gatekeeping duties.
3. The Limits of Public Oversight of Gatekeepers
Policymakers face the challenge of how to induce private actors
to perform public enforcement roles if reputational concerns do not
suffice.
The conventional solution is to impose liability for
gatekeeper noncompliance and to focus public enforcement on
monitoring gatekeepers rather than on their potentially wayward
clients.34 In theory, the SEC can more easily focus enforcement
efforts on monitoring the compliance of securities intermediaries in
order to provide these gatekeepers with incentives to perform
oversight. Part of this logic turns on the greater deterrent effect of
directing enforcement efforts at gatekeepers rather than on the
targeted wrongdoers. For example, although rating agencies are quite
profitable,35 they receive a disproportionately small percentage of the
fruits of issuer misconduct. Nonetheless, potential exposure to
gatekeeper liability may force them to bear disproportionate
exposure to a risk of loss.36 Therefore, even a modest number of
prosecutions may have substantial deterrence effects in encouraging
rating agencies to be more vigilant in monitoring issuers. So long as

33. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1408–09.
34. See Hamdani, supra note 7, at 63–64.
35. See Partnoy, supra note 3, at 654 (discussing how the operating margins of
Moody’s and S&P’s are estimated to be approximately 30%, a significant return for any
industry).
36. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 308–09.
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gatekeepers have cost-effective ways to fulfill gatekeeping mandates,
imposing gatekeeping duties may appear to be an attractive option.
Governments have understandably been enthusiastic about
outsourcing enforcement functions to private gatekeepers because
this approach promises to enhance enforcement while reducing direct
state expenditures.37 The problem is that the appeal of using the
threat of liability to enlist gatekeepers belies the challenges that
policymakers must confront in designing means for effective oversight
of gatekeepers. The more complicated the activity that private
gatekeepers are called to oversee, the more necessary the
gatekeeping role may appear, yet the more difficult it may be for the
government to oversee gatekeeper compliance.38
Securities
gatekeepers form a classic case in which the gatekeeping role may be
essential for uprooting evidence of fraud or excessive risk-taking.
However, imposing gatekeeper duties may merely replace one
enforcement dilemma with another in raising the question of who
watches the watchmen.39
The threat of sanctions for gatekeeper noncompliance may be
toothless in practice, absent effective gatekeeper monitoring. The
opaque nature of gatekeeping roles and tightly interconnected
relationships between gatekeepers and their clients may frustrate
efforts to hold gatekeepers accountable.40 Simply ratcheting up the
level of sanctions in response to the low probability of detection may
be to no avail. Draconian sanctions may elicit public opinion
backlashes since gatekeepers are not the primary wrongdoers. The
threat of high sanctions may also fall on deaf ears if gatekeepers can
effectively cover their tracks and therefore have only a small chance
of being detected, because gatekeepers may steeply discount potential
sanctions.
Policymakers may end up with a situation in which the absence
of accountability leads gatekeepers to engage in merely formalistic

37. See Kraakman, supra note 7, at 54–57 (discussing public enforcers’ broad
enlistment of gatekeepers in a variety of contexts).
38. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 2–6, 18–20 (noting that even sophisticated
private investors may have difficulty in understanding detailed disclosures in a reasonable
time period because of the complicated nature of corporate transactions).
39. This interface of public and private enforcement tools raises one of the basic
challenges of public governance. As Plato framed the issue in The Republic, “quis
custodiet ipsos custodes?” (who will watch the watchmen themselves?), and this tension is
particularly sharp when it comes to privatizing enforcement functions. See Juvenal, Satire
VI, ll. 347–48; Plato, The Republic, Book III, 403e.
40. See Kraakman, supra note 7, at 61–63.
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compliance as a hedge against any anticipated public scrutiny.41 The
irony is that the advantages or skills that make private gatekeepers
serve as attractive complements or substitutes for public enforcement
may also equip these gatekeepers with the tools to facilitate illicit
activity and to obfuscate their malfeasance.42 The existence of
gatekeepers, such as rating agencies, may serve to legitimize and
cover up the very type of wrongdoing the gatekeeper is supposed to
police, and public enforcers may be powerless on their own to
uncover gatekeeper chicanery.43
B.

Creating Accountability Between Gatekeepers and Their
Beneficiaries
1. The Potential Contours of Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers

The limitations of both reputational constraints and public
oversight suggest the appeal of enlisting private oversight of
gatekeepers. Private actors may enjoy informational advantages over
public enforcers in monitoring gatekeeper compliance, and leveraging
the skills of these private parties may help to enhance gatekeeper
accountability.44 Policymakers have at their disposal a spectrum of
options for overseeing gatekeeper compliance ranging from public
enforcement tools, to an array of chimeric public-private strategies, to
fully decentralized private enforcement tools.
For example, parties who directly face harm as a result of a
gatekeeper’s action or inaction may be empowered to sue the

41. The concern is not merely gatekeeper noncompliance, but worse still, that this
outcome may foster contempt and embolden subversion of the law. See Bernard S. Black,
The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV.
781, 787 (2001) (highlighting the inefficiencies of reputational markets).
42. For example, doctors may be best positioned to discern that patients want
prescription drugs for illicit purposes, but may just as easily accept or manufacture
“symptoms” that justify granting a prescription, and public enforcers are ill-equipped to
oversee this doctor-patient interaction.
43. See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 18–20.
44. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54–68 (2002)
(assessing the potential of a broad range of private enforcement tools); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role
of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 121–43 (2005) (laying out the potential
advantages of a range of private enforcement actions); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The
Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 185–88
(discussing how environmental nonprofit organizations and individual citizens may play
important roles in uncovering information about and prosecuting environmental law
violations).
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gatekeeper for compensation.45 Private actors may be enlisted as qui
tam litigants, serving as private attorney generals in exchange for a
percentage of the damages, or as citizen suit litigants in exchange for
lawyers’ fees.46 Public enforcers may offer bounties to solicit private
informants
for
intelligence
on
gatekeeper
compliance.47
Alternatively, they may offer clemency and other forms of
compensation to the primary wrongdoers to come forward and
uncover gatekeeper complicity in their wrongdoing.48
Each of these private monitoring tools may enable public
enforcers to achieve mandates within limited manpower and budget
constraints. Private monitors may also have incentives to innovate in
uncovering gatekeeper violations because they internalize the
monitoring costs and monetary rewards in ways that public monitors
do not.49 But each of these potential private enforcement paths also
entails tradeoffs of economic and social costs for enforcement gains.
45. See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 556–58 (1981)
(discussing the deterrence role that victim suits may play); Stephenson, supra note 44, at
108 (arguing that people directly affected by a potential defendant’s conduct may be in the
best position to detect violations).
46. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 561–62 (2000) (discussing the features of modern qui tam
provisions); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 339, 356 (1990) (discussing the features of citizen suits, which allow prevailing
plaintiffs to recoup their attorney’s fees and expenses); see also Paul E. McGreal &
DeeDee Baba, Applying Coase to Qui Tam Actions Against the States, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 87, 120 (2001) (describing qui tam actions as “creatures of necessity” for the early
American government because of its public enforcement limitations).
47. See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching:
The Institutional and Communal
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 647–51 (2004) (discussing the incentive effects of
bounties for informant information); see also Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s
Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 109 (2003) (discussing the
government’s frequent use of bounties in the criminal law context).
48. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 46 (2000) (noting how rewards for cooperating witnesses may
be necessary to convince them not to exercise their Fifth Amendment rights against selfincrimination).
49. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case
of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403–04, 1438–39 (1998) (discussing
how private litigants have pursued the most challenging and significant discrimination
cases); Stephenson, supra note 44, at 112–13 (suggesting how private litigants may employ
novel strategies and approaches to expand enforcement potential); Thompson, supra note
44, at 206–09 (discussing how environmental groups made supplemental enforcement
projects aiding the local environment a condition of citizen suit settlements, an approach
the Department of Justice has subsequently embraced); Jeannette L. Austin, Comment,
The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and
Public Attorneys General, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 220, 222–23 (1987) (discussing how citizen
suits may force judges to engage in judicial lawmaking to define regulatory requirements
that may siphon regulatory power away from administrative agencies).
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The downside of any private enforcement approach is that private
actors can only be expected to respond to financial incentives so long
as the expected value of rewards exceeds the risks and costs of their
monitoring, reporting, or enforcement,50 which raises the specter of
over- or under-enforcement in any given context.51 Recourse to
broad private monitoring tools entails compromises between the
value of uncovering private information and the intrinsic
inefficiencies of enlisting uncoordinated private actors.52 The social
costs of enlisting private actors may also cause policymakers to pause.
Broad enlistment of private monitors, such as empowering anyone to
serve as a qui tam litigant against a gatekeeper, may fuel social
mistrust. Invasive tactics such as offering rewards for insiders to
come forward as informants (as occurs frequently in criminal
enforcement) or creating incentives for preemptive plea bargaining to
induce insider wrongdoers to report on gatekeepers may have chilling
effects on relationships between gatekeepers and their clients.53
Policymakers may temper some of the potential excesses of
private monitors by retaining public discretion for enforcement
decisions and/or limiting the scope and dollar value of actions brought
by private monitors.54 But unavoidable tradeoffs may still remain.
The broader the net that policymakers cast in eliciting private
monitors, the greater the social and economic costs inflicted on
society for the sake of enforcement gains. In cases where the
monitoring challenges are beyond the capabilities of public enforcers
or identifiable groups of victims, policymakers may have to resort to
decentralized private monitoring tools to hold gatekeepers
accountable.55
50. See Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 167, 175–76 (1985).
51. See Stephenson, supra note 44, at 117–20 (discussing how private enforcement
may disrupt cooperative relationships between regulators and regulated entities, dictate
enforcement agendas, and eliminate possibilities for discretionary enforcement).
52. See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103
MICH. L. REV. 589, 616–17 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private
Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 430–32 (1982).
53. See Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In
Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 240–41 (1995)
(discussing the chilling effects that incentives for whistleblowing may have on lawyerclient relationships).
54. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 587–91 (2000) (discussing public and private law constraints on private parties’
performance of public functions).
55. See Manns, supra note 22, at 929–30 (arguing that decentralized private
monitoring may merit the tradeoffs when public enforcement and victim suits provide
insufficient accountability for gatekeepers). For example, lawyers’ relationships with
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2. How Beneficiaries of Screening Roles May Be Enlisted to Hold
Gatekeepers Accountable
The potential downside of a broad reliance on private
enforcement tools suggests the appeal of more focused strategies for
enlisting private actors as monitors of gatekeeper compliance. The
prime candidates for this role are direct beneficiaries of gatekeepers’
screening roles who may form identifiable groups that possess the
self-interest and ability to monitor gatekeeepers. The absence of any
legal or financial relationship between gatekeepers and the
beneficiaries of screening roles means that autonomous gatekeepers
may face strong temptations to collude with their commercial clients
who foot their bills.56 Having beneficiaries finance gatekeeping
functions in exchange for enforceable rights against gatekeepers
offers a way to create greater accountability between gatekeepers and
their beneficiaries. Imposing caps on gatekeepers’ potential liability
may preserve the desirability of enlisting beneficiaries as monitors of
gatekeepers, while mitigating risks of overdeterrence.
Gatekeepers’ screening roles provide important signals about the
legality and/or accuracy of their clients’ activities that private actors
frequently rely upon to make decisions. The securities context
exemplifies this fact as lawyers, auditors, and rating agencies all
perform “certification” roles that market participants rely upon in
making investment decisions.57 In some gatekeeping contexts, the
benefits may fall diffusely on the public at large,58 but in others,
discrete groups of actors may rely on gatekeepers’ representations
concerning the lawfulness or accuracy of clients’ activity and

clients may be so inscrutable that the only parties capable of unraveling lawyer misconduct
are insiders, which may justify offering rewards or immunity for corporate wrongdoers to
come forward of their own accord and uncover lawyers’ complicity.
56. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 355 (“A serious strategy for converting the
attorney into a gatekeeper must also address the tension between the roles of gatekeeper
and advocate.”).
57. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (and it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 949–54, 966–68 (2003) (discussing
the certification roles for auditors and de facto certification roles for lawyers). But see
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 235, 252 n.76 (observing that rating agencies routinely make the caveat that
“their rating determinations [are] based solely on information provided by the issuer of
securities”). As Part IV.A will discuss, formalizing a certification role for rating agencies
may be part of the pathway to enhancing gatekeeper accountability.
58. In some contexts, such as employers confirming employment eligibility, it may be
very difficult (and quite contentious) to pinpoint a group that benefits from the
gatekeepers’ activities. This fact may make reliance on more decentralized approaches to
gatekeeper monitoring a virtual necessity. See Manns, supra note 22, at 941–44.
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therefore possess strong self-interest in monitoring gatekeepers. To
the extent to which beneficiaries enjoy the ability to scrutinize
gatekeepers’ conduct, beneficiaries may serve as self-interested
monitors of gatekeeper compliance. Small-scale beneficiaries of
gatekeeper compliance may lack the ability and means to oversee
gatekeepers, but larger entities may routinely use their own internal
data and secondary market measures to scrutinize the accuracy of
gatekeepers. For example, banks and funds investing in corporate
debt use internal analysts and secondary market-based measures to
assess the accuracy of ratings.59 Creating legal duties that gatekeepers
owe beneficiaries offers a way to channel beneficiaries’ self-interest
and ability to monitor gatekeepers into sustaining gatekeeper
accountability.
Framing parties who rely on gatekeeper information as
beneficiaries, rather than only as potential victims, highlights the fact
that gatekeeping often constitutes an informational windfall for its
beneficiaries.60 State-imposed gatekeeping duties create or magnify
the scope of these windfall benefits.61 The commercial clients of
gatekeepers generally foot the bill for gatekeepers’ screening roles
(and heightened liability exposure when state mandates are imposed),
while the private beneficiaries of screening roles rely on gatekeeping
yet have no legal or financial relationship with the gatekeepers. The
problem is that gatekeepers’ dependence on commercial parties to
fund screening roles may magnify existing temptations for
gatekeepers to focus exclusively on serving their commercial clients
by engaging in formalistic compliance with their duties. For this
reason, when feasible, beneficiaries should face both the benefits and
burdens of gatekeeping by financing gatekeepers’ screening roles in
exchange for claims against gatekeepers for noncompliance.
At first glance, having the burdens for financing gatekeeping fall
on the shoulders of gatekeepers’ commercial clients may appear

59. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2003) (discussing the role of in-house
analysts at banks).
60. Extensive literature has documented the distorting incentive effects of windfalls
(and the closely related idea of givings) and the challenges of attempting to force
beneficiaries to shoulder the costs of their benefits. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 590–608 (2001) (detailing the challenges of
requiring beneficiaries of state windfalls to pay for at least part of their resulting increase
in wealth); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1546–57 (1999) (discussing the
difficulties facing efforts to recoup public and private windfalls).
61. See Kades, supra note 60, at 1531–32 (discussing the potential government roles in
creating windfalls).
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appealing. After all, having potential wrongdoers pay to clear their
names of any suspicion might seem more fair than requiring those
directly affected by wrongdoing to shoulder these screening costs.
However, having the beneficiaries of screening roles finance
gatekeeping functions may help to dampen the inherent tension in
gatekeepers’ simultaneously policing and serving their commercial
clients by creating direct relationships and accountability to
beneficiaries.62
This approach would place gatekeepers and
beneficiaries in ongoing, repeat-player relationships, which would
complement more sporadic interaction in adversarial contexts.63
When commercial clients of gatekeepers fund the bills for
gatekeeping, they have interests in pushing for systematic
underinvestments in screening, and gatekeepers may understandably
wish to err on the side of retaining and expanding their business.64 In
contrast, beneficiaries would have incentives to seek to tie gatekeeper
funding to transparency and efficacy in cost-effectively screening out
wrongdoers.65 Beneficiaries’ funding of gatekeeping roles would also
heighten the endowment effect, as beneficiaries would have greater
reason to scrutinize gatekeepers to ensure that investments in
gatekeeping pay off.66
3. The Virtues of a User Fee Approach
While in some cases beneficiaries may be able to contract
directly with gatekeepers, financing gatekeepers through governmentadministered user fees may be the most effective way to preserve the

62. In some cases, unfunded mandates for gatekeeping may be a practical necessity, as
the administrative costs of having beneficiaries fund screening roles may be
disproportionately high relative to the costs of gatekeeping. See Kraakman, supra note 7,
at 61–63 (discussing contexts where gatekeepers can screen for wrongdoers at low cost).
63. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of
Class Action by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 711 (2002) (discussing how repeat
player interaction enhances the ability of institutions to refine their negotiations); Owen
M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076–78 (1984) (discussing how corporate
defendants have considerable experience in litigation and settlements, which gives them
leverage as repeat-players over one-shot litigants).
64. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 16, at 305–06 (discussing how corporate management
may create incentives for securities intermediaries to underinvest in screening roles).
65. But see Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 987, 1000–03 (1994) (discussing how large shareholders may
collaborate with management to maximize their returns even at the expense of the
shareholders as a whole).
66. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179–81 (1997) (discussing how loss aversion can heighten attention dedicated to property
and investments).
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cost-saving objectives of gatekeeping.67 By pooling the resources of
beneficiaries, a user fee approach would provide leverage vis-à-vis
gatekeepers by creating a single locus of demand for their screening
services.68 This leverage may allow the administrators of a user fee
system to secure the services of gatekeepers at a lower cost (and at
least partly offset administrative costs), to heighten gatekeeper
transparency as a quid pro quo for funding, and to coordinate
beneficiaries’ efforts to avoid needless overlap of both gatekeepers
and oversight.69 A user fee approach may also be designed to ensure
that gatekeepers continue to provide services for smaller beneficiaries
who may otherwise be unable to afford them, such as by allocating
fees on a pro rata basis of affected assets.
The viability of a user fee approach will turn on the ability to
identify the direct beneficiaries of gatekeepers’ screening roles, to
impose user fees on these beneficiaries, and to contain the
administrative costs. By necessity, a user fee approach may entail a
more active government role in the provision of gatekeeping services
by integrating public and private oversight. Because gatekeeping
often takes place before the primary beneficiaries of gatekeeping
information are readily identifiable, the government may have to
stand in the shoes of these beneficiaries by first financing gatekeeping
functions and later by pooling the resources of beneficiaries to pay for
gatekeeping. For example, corporate bond holders would not own
the bond before initial ratings are issued for corporate debt. For this
reason, a government entity would likely have to stand in their place
to finance the initial ratings prior to collection of a user fee from
corporate bond holders at the time bonds are purchased or
thereafter.70

67. See, e.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 16, at 800–02 (discussing how user fees
can facilitate economically efficient allocation of goods and services).
68. This Article’s conception of the role of user fees is different than the conventional
view. Rather than only valuing the allocative function of user fees in directing the
provision of public or quasi-public services, see Spitzer, supra note 16, at 343–45, it focuses
on how pooling resources in user fee approaches may be used as a basis for collective
action by private beneficiaries to hold gatekeepers accountable.
69. One of the ironies of our legal system is that policymakers primarily attempt to
overcome collective action problems after disasters have occurred and litigation has
arisen, such as through class action suits. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991). In contrast,
this Article seeks to embrace a preemptive strategy of leveraging collective action under a
user fee approach to make it less likely that there will be a need for litigation.
70. See infra Part III.B.
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The government’s role in a user fee approach may facilitate
complementary efforts to temper the potential excesses of private
enforcement. For example, participants in a user fee approach may
be required to bring suits against gatekeepers within administrative
channels rather than through formal litigation.71 A user fee system
may require vetting of potential actions against gatekeepers by
vesting discretionary power to allow a suit to proceed in the hands of
user fee administrators or a majority of the beneficiaries.72 This
approach may provide ways to screen out nuisance suits and to ensure
that the broader interests of beneficiaries are being served by any
given action. A user fee approach may also facilitate corrective
action as ongoing relationships between gatekeepers and beneficiaries
may provide outlets for remedying shortcomings in gatekeepers’
processes without the costs of litigation.73
4. The Purpose Behind Capped, Enforceable Rights Against
Gatekeepers
The existence of enforceable rights against gatekeepers with
capped liability may serve to heighten incentives for gatekeeper
compliance and partly to remedy injuries caused by beneficiaries’
reliance on gatekeepers. Conventional victim suits empower private
parties harmed by a wrongdoer to bring suit seeking to be made
whole.74 But the challenge of applying this approach to gatekeepers is
that gatekeepers are not generally the primary wrongdoers and
therefore full-scale victim suit liability may pose significant risks of
overdeterrence.75

71. Limiting suits to an administrative process offers opportunities to scale back the
costs of proceedings by relying on streamlined procedures. See William H. Simon, Solving
Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 127, 154 (2004) (comparing the virtues of streamlined administrative
procedures to expensive lawyer-dominated litigation).
72. A similar approach takes place under the False Claims Act as government lawyers
review and may assume control of qui tam litigation to reduce dangers of overenforcement by private litigants. The difference in the qui tam suit context is that private
litigants may proceed with their case if the government does not take control of the suit.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2)–(3) (2006).
73. See Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 535 (2004) (discussing how renegotiation costs
are low among repeat players).
74. See Stephenson, supra note 44, at 108 (discussing the incentives for conventional
victim suits).
75. See Hamdani, supra note 7, at 115–16 (discussing the dangers of over-deterrence
from holding gatekeepers liable for all injuries that flow from their failed screening).
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Gatekeepers may at times expressly aid and abet wrongdoer
clients in wrongdoing, and existing victim suit provisions, such as Rule
10b-5 class actions, address outright fraud.76
The nature of
gatekeeping, however, means that gatekeepers’ role in wrongdoing
will generally be more subtle and instead fall at or near the
boundaries of negligent or grossly negligent conduct.77 For this
reason empowering uncapped suits against gatekeepers could easily
expose gatekeepers to liability that is disproportionate to their own
culpability.78 Applying joint and several liability to gatekeepers could
be financially ruinous and drive gatekeepers out of markets in which
they perform important screening roles. It may also be difficult to
apportion blame in contexts in which the foreseeable injury flows
directly from “gates” left open by failed gatekeeping.
Instead, the underlying focus of beneficiaries’ rights should be on
prospectively motivating gatekeepers to fulfill their duties through a
system of capped liability. One of the underlying virtues of enlisting
gatekeepers is that they enjoy little of the upside from wrongdoing by
their clients.79 For this reason the threat of modest potential
sanctions may induce gatekeeper compliance while minimizing the
risk of driving gatekeepers out of the markets they serve.80
Therefore, gatekeeper liability exposure to victims should be based
on a system of caps that may bear little relation to the actual injury
suffered by those relying on gatekeeper compliance. Caps on liability
may admittedly under-deter gatekeepers in some contexts, yet this
tradeoff is necessary to ensure that reforms do not end up
undermining the gatekeeper markets they are intended to safeguard.
While this approach may dampen the incentives of beneficiaries,
institutional investors in particular would still be motivated to police
compliance, because their broader economic interests are affected by
gatekeeping.

76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
77. See infra Part II.A.2–3.
78. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 306 (“Gatekeepers simply lack the economic scale to
be able to fund significant compensation to investors, particularly in the new era of megalitigation.”).
79. See id. at 308–09 (discussing how gatekeepers “receive[] only a limited payoff from
any involvement in misconduct” compared to the primary wrongdoers).
80. See Hamdani, supra note 7, at 103 (discussing how sanction levels may require
policymakers to consider the tradeoff between preventing misconduct and driving
gatekeepers and their clients out of the market).
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II. THE NEED FOR RATING AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Significance of Rating Agencies
Rating agencies reflect both the potential and pitfalls of
gatekeepers, and their central role as screeners of risk and
shortcomings underscores the need for gatekeeper accountability.
Rating agencies serve to bridge an information gap between debt
issuers and existing and prospective creditors.81 Sifting through the
myriad of financial and nonfinancial disclosures of issuers may simply
be economically infeasible for most creditors, which may limit lending
levels and the liquidity of debt markets.82 Rating agencies initially
arose as subscription-based businesses that mitigated this problem by
offering private ratings on the creditworthiness of issuers and debt
issues to creditors.83 But starting in 1975, the federal government
effectively made ratings a public good by issuing numerous
regulations that required issuers to secure ratings concerning their
creditworthiness in order to participate in financial markets.84
Rating agencies perform a “verification function in . . . fixedincome markets,”85 which complements the gatekeeper roles of
auditors and lawyers in screening financial and nonfinancial
disclosures. Rating agencies process both public disclosures and
nonpublic information on issuers and reduce risks to discrete
categories for the market to process. This screening role has made
rating agencies serve a gatekeeping function from their inception,
operating as potential choke points to flag both excessive risk
exposure and signs of misconduct or fraud. Federal and state laws
and regulations mandate that debt receives the highest ratings to be
eligible for purchase by money market funds, insurance companies,
and other financial entities, and bond indentures frequently contain
81. See Partnoy, supra note 35, at 632–33 (discussing the information asymmetry
between issuers and creditors).
82. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1110 (1995) (discussing the role of rating
agencies and other securities intermediaries in reducing risk by distilling ambiguous
information into clearer signals for markets); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613–21 (1984)
(discussing the gatekeeping roles of securities intermediaries).
83. See Harold Furchtgott-Roth et al., The Law and Economics of Regulating Ratings
Firms, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 49, 76–77 (2007) (providing an overview of the
historical development of subscription-based rating agencies).
84. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 6, at 35,258–59.
85. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 59–60
(Yasuyaki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006).
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trigger provisions that are based on debt’s retention of investment
grade rating levels.86 This fact means that rating agencies enjoy
tremendous leverage over their issuer clients as the value of a bond
issue may turn on its rating.87 The globalization and integration of
financial markets, the evolution of financial products with increasing
complexity, and the sheer growth of debt markets have heightened
the significance of U.S. rating agencies, as they now rate over thirty
trillion dollars of debt.88
B.

The Distinctiveness of Ratings

The distinctiveness of ratings turns on the fact that they reflect
the long-term, structural creditworthiness of issuers. Ratings are
derived through “fundamental credit analysis, which incorporates an
evaluation of franchise value, financial statement analysis,
management quality, and scenario analysis.”89 Ratings are designed
to reflect a balanced tradeoff between accuracy and stability, which
focuses on long-term risks and incorporates both quantitative and
qualitative analysis. Formal letter ratings indicate categories of risk
exposure, which rating agencies may supplement with additional
signals, such as changes in rating outlooks and watchlist designations,
that provide additional short-term signals for markets.90
This approach means that ratings do not change each minute or
day based on every piecemeal bit of information. Other marketbased information, such as credit default swaps, serves to fill that role
in reflecting the immediate oscillations of the market on every tip of a
hat.91 Credit default swaps serve as an equivalent of insurance against
default events as holders of debt pay a “premium” to another party in
exchange for compensation if a default event occurs.92 The virtue of
credit default swaps is that they allow creditors to hedge against loss,
86. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 6, at 35,259.
87. See, e.g., L. Paul Hsueh & David S. Kidwell, Bond Ratings: Are Two Better Than
One?, 17 FIN. MGMT. 46, 47–48 (1988).
88. See S. REP. NO. 109-326, at 3 (2006); see also Partnoy, supra note 15, at 65–66
(discussing the scale of rated debt).
89. Richard Cantor & Christopher Mann, Special Comment, Measuring the
Performance of Corporate Bond Ratings 15, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, April 2003,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=996025.
90. Id. at 27.
91. The differences between credit default swaps and ratings are similar to what
distinguish police officers from building inspectors. Both have an eye on identifying risks
and preempting wrongdoing, but the building inspectors focus on structural issues, such as
long-term risks, rather than present infractions.
92. See Gretchen Morgenson, In the Fed’s Cross Hairs: Exotic Game, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2008, § 3 (Business), at 1.
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and both the initial sale and resale prices for these swaps serve as
proxies for risk. Credit default swaps themselves, however, have
become speculative instruments as part of a fifty trillion dollar
industry that is twice the value of the U.S. stock market.93 The
speculative element of these instruments means that credit default
swap holders may seek to distort the actual risks of the marketplace
and foster a false sense of security or panic to serve their short-term
ends.94
Credit default spreads also tend to reflect market
overreactions and thus lead to a very high rate of reversals of risk
assessments.95
In contrast, ratings seek to approximate the long-term
creditworthiness of issuers. While market-based measures may form
useful reference points as snapshots of market sentiment, it would be
difficult to hold credit default swap market manipulators accountable
for their conduct. Similarly, analysts who offer a cacophony of
opinions on issuers also form poor candidates for a liability-backed
gatekeeping duty, because they have no relationship with issuers or
creditors.96 In contrast, the nature of the screening role of rating
agencies makes them well positioned to be enlisted as liabilityinduced gatekeepers.
Another distinctive feature of rating agencies is that they serve as
a de facto backstop for existing auditor and lawyer gatekeeping
duties. Auditors and lawyers each see slices of a company’s risks and
potential for fraud, while rating agencies serve as the sole gatekeeper
whose role is to look at all issuer disclosures on an ongoing basis in
order to make a big picture assessment of risk.97 For this reason, this
93. See Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at A1.
94. See Gillian Wee, Credit Swaps Show Fear, Not Reality, Executives Say,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109
&sid=a.o1tHRJoe.k&refer=home (arguing that “widening credit default swaps show a
disconnect between” the actual balance sheets of companies and the fears of panicked
investors); see also Edmund L. Andrews, Treasury’s Plan Would Give Fed Wide Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at A1 (noting that proposed reforms to overhaul the Federal
Reserve’s power would not address the distortions speculation has caused in credit default
swaps markets).
95. See Cantor & Mann, supra note 89, at 27 (highlighting the dramatically higher rate
of reversals of risk assessments for credit default swaps compared to ratings).
96. See Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083,
1090–95 (2007) (discussing the challenges of imposing duties on analysts and dismissing
their role as potential gatekeepers).
97. Investment banks may serve a similar role as screeners of corporate disclosures by
providing fairness opinions on proposed transactions. See Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers,
Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 409–16 (2003) (discussing the
potential and limits of enlisting investment banks as screeners of corporate wrongdoing).
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Article argues that both formalizing and expanding the scope of
rating agency duties may provide them with incentives to scrutinize
disclosures more carefully and to identify significant risks more
accurately.
C.

The Prominent Role of Rating Agencies in Recent Financial Crises

The significance of rating agencies is underscored by the fact that
they have been at the heart of several scandals that have rocked the
financial world, such as the turn-of-the-century accounting frauds and
the more recent subprime mortgage crisis.98 Commentators have
attributed these market and regulatory failures to a broad set of
causes ranging from excessive risk-seeking in a bubble market,99
structural shortcomings of corporate self-governance,100 lax oversight
by the SEC,101 and an erosion of the independence of securities
market intermediaries.102
But even putting aside concerns that fairness opinions are largely rubber stamps, rating
agencies have ongoing roles in monitoring corporate risks, while investment banking
scrutiny is often a onetime event as banks are hired for individual transactions. See, e.g.,
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 555–57 (2002) (arguing that fairness opinions have
“doubtful” value); William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and Why We
Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 533–36 (1992) (questioning the value
of fairness opinions because of their lack of precision and inability to predict price).
98. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS:
TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES
3–5 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf (discussing how approximately ten
percent of publicly traded companies issued financial statement restatements from 1997 to
2002); see also George B. Moriarty & Phillip B. Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the
Quality of Financial Reporting, 17 FIN. EXECUTIVE 53, 54 (2001) (documenting the
significant increase in financial statement restatements in the late 1990s).
99. See, e.g., Werner De Bondt, Bubble Psychology, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES 205,
210–12 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 2003); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic:
Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 395–99
(2006) (attributing the breakdowns of Enron’s corporate governance in part to failures by
the board of directors to oversee the directors and to police for self-interested
relationships in corporate transactions).
100. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP.
148–77 (2002), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv
020102rpt1.pdf.
INCREASED
101. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS:
WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 3 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02302.pdf
(discussing how the SEC was understaffed and underfinanced, and lacked the ability to
offer any semblance of effective oversight of the auditing process).
102. See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 823–27
(2004) (discussing how the autonomy of auditors from their clients was gradually eroded
by both statutes and the auditing process); Sale, supra note 1, at 403–07 (arguing that
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The defining irony of these market failures is that they stemmed
from a changed landscape of market incentives that cajoled securities
intermediaries into tacit complicity with their corporate clients in
facilitating bubble markets or fraud.103 A corporate governance
system posited on executives’ supposed alignment of interest with
shareholders through stock options, coupled with oversight by
securities market intermediaries, foundered in the face of economic
incentives that rewarded a myopic short-term focus and tacit
collusion.104 For example, executives, financiers, and issuers’ hired
help of lawyers, accountants, and rating agencies all profited from
packaging debt offerings in ever more deceptive ways in disregard of
both securities laws and the interests of investors.105 Executives could
cash in stock options, banks could benefit from fees and equity stakes,
and lawyers, accountants, and rating agencies all stood to gain greater
revenue streams from thin legal scrutiny, dodgy accounting, and
dubious ratings.106 Weak public enforcement tools could do little to
stop the consequences of this convergence of interests among
corporate
executives,
directors,
and
securities
market
intermediaries.107
Deferential ratings and inaction by rating agencies have been as
integral to facilitating these financial crises as the tacit complicity of
auditors and lawyers, because rating agencies form a backstop of
oversight for issuers’ financial and nonfinancial disclosures.108 The
gatekeepers, such as accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers, failed the public by
not adequately screening for corporate wrongdoing).
103. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1408–09; Sale supra note 1, at 403–07.
104. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3–12 (2004); Coffee, supra note
7, at 312–18.
105. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275, 1341–51 (2002) (discussing “the degree to which Enron dominated its
auditor,” Arthur Andersen); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management
and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1233, 1237–39 (2002) (discussing the interdependence of Arthur Andersen’s auditors
with Enron and the internal agency problems that compromised Arthur Andersen’s
integrity).
106. For example, in the early 1980s equity-based compensation for executives was
virtually nonexistent, but by 2001 two-thirds of the compensation of executives at large
corporations consisted of equity-based pay. See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing
Equity-Based Pay, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23, 23 (2003).
107. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139,
185–90 (2006) (discussing the limits of the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure
systems for securities regulation).
108. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1408–09 (arguing that “the true denominator in
the Enron debacle” was “the collective failure of the gatekeepers”); Sale, supra note 1, at
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act sought to address the shortcomings that led to
past financial crises by building on the preexisting gatekeeping role of
auditors and formalizing a gatekeeping role for lawyers.109 Congress,
however, until quite recently, has all but overlooked meaningful
reform of rating agencies’ role as gatekeepers.110 This omission
ignored how rating agencies embraced the incentives that other
securities intermediaries faced, which was to indulge markets’ underappreciation of risk by granting lax ratings in exchange for ever
increasing amounts of business.
1. The Role of Rating Agencies in Legitimizing Subprime Debt
Instruments
The current subprime mortgage crisis has underscored
dramatically the significance of rating agencies and the consequences
from lax ratings. To put in perspective the role of rating agencies in
the current crisis, the primary victims of Enron were equity holders
who lost over sixty billion dollars,111 while Enron’s creditors held
thirteen billion dollars of debt at the time of Enron’s collapse.112 In
contrast, write-downs and credit losses from the subprime mortgage
crisis alone are estimated at upwards of one trillion dollars.113 These
403–07 (arguing that gatekeepers, such as accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers,
failed the public); see also Lynnley Browning, Small Firm at Center of Loan Universe, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at C6 (discussing law firms’ roles in the issuance of subprime
mortgage collateralized debt obligations of dubious quality).
109. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see also David S. Ruder et al., The
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to Corporate
Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103, 1110–12
(2005) (describing the expanded gatekeeper roles for auditors).
110. The notable exception was the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1327–29 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, and 23
U.S.C.) (expanding opportunities for new entrants to be certified as recognized rating
agencies). However, this reform effort did little to change the underlying incentives for
rating agencies. See infra Part II.D.2.
111. See Stephen Labaton, Enron’s Collapse: The Lobbying, Auditing Firms Exercise
Power in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A1.
112. See Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, Bond Raters Make Effort to Repair Credibility,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, at C1.
113. In a period of months the estimates of write-downs and credit losses from the
subprime crisis has dramatically increased with no clear end in sight. Compare Jody
Shenn & David Mildenberg, Subprime, CDO Bank Losses May Exceed $265 Billion,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087
&refer=home&sid=aCtr4_6NdXdw (noting S&P’s estimates that losses may exceed $265
billion), with Jody Shenn, Fed Slashes Subprime, Alt-A Mortgage Payment Shocks, S&P
Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601009&sid=asN4m0P5mLm4&refer=bond (noting that losses related to collateralized
debt obligations may top $460 billion), and Yalman Onaran, Banks’ Subprime Losses Top
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are merely the losses out of trillions of dollars of residential
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations based
on subprime mortgages whose minimal risk exposure was vouched for
by rating agencies.114
Rating agencies have been at the forefront of the legitimization
and expansion of the RMBS and CDO industry, which has grown into
a multi-trillion dollar market.115 These debt instruments share many
similar features that raise common considerations from a ratings
standpoint. RMBS and mortgage-based CDOs are debt obligations
based on large pools of mortgage loans, and their cash flows are based
on principal and interest payments from the underlying mortgages.116
Both serve as risk-shifting instruments, which enable mortgage banks
and brokers and commercial banks to unload mortgage portfolios on
secondary markets while shielding themselves from liability.
Sponsors and originators of a RMBS or CDO purchase pools of
mortgages, which they in turn sell to a special purpose vehicle
(“SPV”), a faceless corporation whose sole purpose is to serve as the
formal issuer of the debt instrument in order to form liability buffers
between the sponsors and mortgage originators and downstream
purchasers. The SPV issues a RMBS or CDO with several tranches
of debt.117 Each tranche typically consists of either senior, mezzanine,
or subordinated equity, based on their increasing degree of credit
risk, and the credit ratings for each tranche reflect this risk with senior
and mezzanine tranches typically receiving investment grade and
subordinated equity receiving non-investment grade ratings.118 As
underlying mortgages default or underperform, the higher credit
quality tranches receive priority in payments over the lower quality
tranches. RMBS or CDO sponsors or originators typically retain the

$500 Billion on Writedowns, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSKLfqh2qd9o&refer=worldwide (discussing $500
billion in existing writedowns and credit losses from the subprime crisis and over $1 trillion
in likely losses).
114. Shenn & Mildenberg, supra note 113 (discussing how “almost half the subprime
bonds rated by S&P in 2006 and early 2007 were cut or placed on review” for ratings
downgrades in 2008, a fact which suggests rating agencies’ lax approach).
115. See Vikas Bajaj & Mark Landler, Mortgage Losses Echo in Europe and on Wall
St., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at A1 (discussing the scale of subprime mortgage CDO
exposure facing banks and other creditors).
116. See Ferrell et al., supra note 1, at 7.
117. See Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical
and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 107–08 (2005) (discussing the potential
ways that mortgages can be divided into tranches for securitizations).
118. See Ferrell et al., supra note 1, at 7–8.
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most subordinated equity tranche, but otherwise pass on all of the
risk to debt purchasers.119
RMBS and CDOs vary in the composition of their tranches.
RMBS typically have a much higher percentage of senior tranches
which signal lower risk, while CDOs have a higher percentage of
subordinated equity, which reflects the fact that CDOs generally
invest in higher risk mortgages. The other primary difference
between RMBS and CDOs is that CDOs are often actively
managed.120 CDOs detail asset classes and investment strategies that
are designed to ensure that tranches secure high ratings, but collateral
managers of CDOs may enjoy discretion to purchase and sell the
underlying assets.121 CDOs may be tailored to meet investors’ needs
in terms of maturity and risk levels, which means that CDOs are less
likely to be publicly traded than RMBS.122
These debt instruments are structured to secure favorable ratings
in order to sidestep regulatory obligations and to enhance their value
and market reach. If a debt offering receives ratings that fall within
one of the four highest ratings from a nationally recognized securities
rating agency (and meets other criteria), then the SPV does not have
to register as an investment company under the Investment Act of
1940.123 Investment grade ratings not only may heighten perceptions
of a debt instrument’s value, but also are effectively required for
119. Originators of a RMBS generally retain only the most subordinated equity
tranche at the time of the initial sale, while the extent and amount of debt retained by
CDO issuers varies more widely. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured
Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2200–06 (2007).
120. A RMBS can be registered with the SEC and publicly traded as is typically the
case with RMBS sponsored by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, federally chartered
corporations who serve to enhance liquidity of secondary mortgage markets.
Alternatively, investment banks may issue private-label RMBS, which are not registered
under the securities laws and do not comply with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
underwriting guidelines, such as through a Rule 144A offering to qualified institutional
investors. Ferrell et al., supra note 1, at 29–31.
121. CDOs may directly hold pools of mortgages or purchase mortgage-backed
securities (or purchase a broader range of assets). Id.
122. Synthetic CDO equivalents exist for subprime mortgages which function as
derivatives in having their value turn on the value of underlying subprime mortgage
CDOs. The proliferation of these synthetic instruments dramatically magnified the scale
of subprime mortgage CDO exposure. STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL CASH FLOW AND
SYNTHETIC CDO CRITERIA 14 (2002), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
spf/pdf/fixedincome/cdo_criteria2002_FINAL TOC.pdf.
123. To qualify for the Rule 3a-7 exemption from treatment as an investment company,
in addition to securing high ratings, the issuer must issue “fixed-income securities or other
securities [whose payments] depend primarily on the cash flow from eligible assets” and
comply with both contractual and regulatory restrictions on the acquisition and disposal of
assets, as well as oversight of the assets. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2008).
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ERISA fiduciaries to purchase RMBS or CDOs in order to avoid
liability exposure.124 Favorable ratings can dramatically expand the
scope of potential purchasers to encompass pension funds and other
institutions.125
2. The Culpability of Rating Agencies in the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis
RMBS and CDOs were designed as means to heighten liquidity
in secondary mortgage markets. The problem is that both internal
safeguards and external ratings failed to accurately assess risks posed
by subprime mortgage portfolios as mortgage originators, issuers, and
rating agencies turned a blind eye to excessive risk taking in their
desire for quick profits. Subprime mortgages consist of adjustable
rate mortgages generally sold to high-risk borrowers, which have a
low interest rate for the first two to three years but then adjust to
much higher rates based on an interest benchmark (such as the
London Interbank Bid Offered Rate or “LIBOR”).126 Subprime
mortgages generally do not conform to the underwriting standards
laid out by the Government Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac,127 and this fact coupled with risk-seeking behavior,
deception, and outright fraud by originators and issuers proved to be
a catalyst for a financial crisis.128
Mortgage lenders and brokers exploited the RMBS and CDO
market by “flipping” subprime mortgages and engaging in lax
underwriting practices and even outright fraud that accounted for

124. See Ferrell et al., supra note 1, at 14 (discussing restrictions ERISA fiduciaries
face concerning purchases of unrated RMBS or CDOs); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1.104(a)(1)(B) (2006) (laying out the “prudent man” standard of care for ERISA
fiduciaries).
125. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., supra note 6, at 119–20 (discussing the
ratings requirements for money market funds, insurers, and pension funds to purchase
debt securities).
126. See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 122, at 4.
127. Ironically, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s purchases of subprime mortgages
helped to fuel the rapid growth of this market as they purchased $515 billion of subprime
debt from 2003 to 2006. See Carol D. Leonning, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the
Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A1.
128. While subprime loans have captivated public attention, similar problems have
arisen with Alt-A and Jumbo loans that also do not conform with underwriting standards
laid out by the Government Sponsored Agencies. Alt-A loans are extended to borrowers
with good credit but are based on low underwriting scrutiny, and Jumbo loans are loans to
borrowers with good credit that exceed the loan limits placed on the Government
Sponsored Agencies. See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 2, at 2.
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approximately twenty-five percent of subprime losses.129 Once
lenders sold the mortgages to secondary markets, they were largely
shielded from liability, which posed significant moral hazards.130 The
culpability of RMBS and CDO originators and rating agencies lies in
the fact that in their zeal to expedite the flow of these debt
instruments to markets and to pad their profit margins, issuers largely
stopped using collateral appraisers to engage in due diligence on
purchased mortgages.131 In 2000, collateral appraisers reviewed
approximately thirty percent of mortgages in RMBS and CDO pools,
but by 2005 approximately five percent of mortgages were being
reviewed.132 Greed underpinned this shift as it costs about $350 for
review of each underlying mortgage,133 and issuers of RMBS and
CDOs did not want to cut into their profit margins when they enjoyed
high demand for their products. Issuers may simply not have wanted
to know how much risk they were assuming because of disclosure
obligations, while turning a blind eye shifted the risk to debt
purchasers.134 Rating agencies failed to hold issuers accountable by
engaging in lax portfolio reviews and not requiring that collateral
appraisers review a higher percentage of the portfolios as a condition
for ratings.135
Rating agencies employed methodologies that failed to reflect
the risks of subprime mortgage debt instruments, even as the
subprime RMBS and CDO market grew dramatically from 2000 to

129. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Underwriting & Fraud Significant Drivers
of Subprime Defaults; New Originator Reviews (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.american
securitization.com/uploadedFiles/Fitch_Originators_1128.pdf. (discussing widespread
problems with fraud, poor underwriting, and deceptive practices by mortgage loan
originators).
130. See Dennis Hevesi, Looser U.S. Lending Rules are Protested, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2004, at B4 (discussing how assignee liability applies to mortgages and subprime debt
instruments).
131. See Vikas Bajaj & Jenny Anderson, Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on
Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at A1.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. This problem was particularly pronounced in nonagency originated and issued
RMBS, which accounted for over one trillion dollars in 2006 alone. See Ashcraft &
Schuermann, supra note 2, at 2. The mortgage portfolios in these debt instruments did not
conform to underwriting standards laid out by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See Ashcraft
& Schuermann, supra note 2, at 2. Id.
135. Rating agencies have sought to absolve themselves of responsibility through use of
the caveat that “their rating determinations [are] based solely on information provided by
the issuer of securities,” Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 252 n.76, yet this claim overlooks the
leverage that rating agencies enjoy in being able to demand that issuers make additional
disclosures or satisfy diligence requirements in order to qualify for a high rating.
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2006,136 and the quality of the underlying mortgages equally rapidly
deteriorated.137 Instead of engaging in actual diligence of the risks
involved, demanding additional issuer disclosures, or scrutinizing
collateral appraisers’ assessments to justify their conclusions, rating
agencies primarily relied on mathematical models that estimated the
loss distribution and simulated the cash flows of RMBS and CDOs
using historical data. Rating agencies’ methods weighed initial
expectations of loss heavily in computing the lifetime expected losses
for a given subprime debt instrument, and flawed and overlyoptimistic assumptions fueled a system of lax ratings which failed to
anticipate or reflect the housing market downturn.138
Rating agencies’ disclosure of their methodologies to issuers
allowed issuers to game the system by systematically understating the
risks involved, which made individual tranches and these debt
instruments as a whole to appear to have dramatically lower risks
than they merited.139 Banks and other issuers of subprime RMBS and
CDOs exploited this approach to profit in issuing trillions of dollars of
these debt instruments, because their sole concern was the initial sale,
and they faced little to no risk exposure once they passed the debt on
to downstream purchasers in the United States and abroad. As the
real estate bubble began to burst in 2006 and 2007, flaws in the rating
agencies’ methodologies began to be exposed on a large scale, but
downstream purchasers were left holding the bag on devalued
investments that they purchased in reliance on lax ratings.140

136. For example, firms issued $508 billion of subprime debt instruments in 2005,
compared to $56 billion in 2000. Michael Hudson, How Wall Street Stoked the Mortgage
Meltdown, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at A1.
137. The percentage of subprime mortgages that were securitized in RMBS or CDOs
increased from 28% in 1995 to 54% in 2001 and 75% in 2006. The percentage of subprime
mortgages increased from 8% of the mortgage market in 2001 to 20% in 2006. See Todd J.
Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U.
COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7–8), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1106907 (discussing the growth of the subprime mortgage securitization market);
Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 31–
33 (Working Paper Series, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396 (discussing
the explosive growth in the subprime mortgage market and the corresponding dramatic
deterioration in the quality of subprime mortgage debt).
138. See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 2, at 55–60; see also Mark Whitehouse,
Slices of Risk: How a Formula Ignited Market That Burned Some Big Investors, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A1 (discussing how the rating agencies’ assumptions concerning risk
led to widespread reliance on erroneous ratings for subprime mortgage debt instruments).
139. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 77.
140. See Henny Sender, Carrick Mollenkamp, & Michael Mackenzie, Risky Strategies
Take Toll on Traders, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2005, at C6 (discussing banks’ efforts to
exploit rating agencies’ lax approach).
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Rating agencies’ lax approach may have arisen in part due to
rating agencies’ addiction to generous fees for engaging in cursory
diligence of dubiously packaged products. For example, “Moody’s
earned $884 million in 2006, or 43 percent of [its] total revenue,” from
rating RMBS and CDOs.141 This number is triple the amount that
Moody’s earned from these debt instruments only five years earlier,142
so it is easy to see how rating agencies had little, if any, incentive to
stop the gravy train and to scrutinize subprime debt instruments more
closely.
Rating agencies not only appear culpable for facilitating the
crisis143 but also may be grossly negligent, if not willfully complicit, in
papering over its magnitude and allowing the bubble market to grow
even more. For example, rating agencies largely deferred rating cuts
on AAA rated subprime collateralized mortgage obligations, even
where upwards of forty percent of the underlying portfolios faced
default.144 This approach allowed bond holders to delay writing off
significant portions of the loans and allowed bonds to continue to be
sold to money market funds, insurance companies, and other high
quality asset holders.145 Similarly, rating agencies declined to
downgrade bond insurers because of concerns that downgrades would
trigger a cascade of debt downgrades throughout the financial
system.146 While this approach may have staved off a short-term
141. John Glover, Regulators May Limit S&P, Moody’s Structured Debt Business,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 6, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=azu7haZC4x.M#.
142. Id.
143. See John Glover, CDO Ratings to Fall as Losses Trigger Fitch Overhaul,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aE6fC9jpTXeg# (discussing how Fitch acknowledges that it was overly
optimistic in its default rate and other assumptions in its original CDO methodology, a
tacit recognition of the role of its negligence in the subprime crisis).
144. Mark Pittman, Moody’s, S&P Defer Cuts on AAA Subprime, Hiding Loss,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601109&sid=aRLWzHsF16IY&refer=home (discussing how rating agencies have
declined to issue rating downgrades on hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime debt).
145. See David Evans, Subprime Infects $300 Billion of Money Market Funds,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archives&sd=aV5mGtuGGu2E# (discussing how rating agencies’ lax ratings on subprime
CDOs exposed money market funds to massive liability exposure on debt that money
market funds could not have even bought, but for the conferral of AAA ratings).
146. See Shannon D. Harrington & Christine Richard, Moody’s, S&P Say MBIA Is
AAA:
Debt Market Not So Sure, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 27, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYJDy4utzDo# (discussing
how rating agencies’ decisions not to downgrade bond insurer MBIA have prevented $637
billion of debt backed by MBIA from downgrades and saved banks approximately $70
billion in losses).
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magnification of the crisis, it may have reduced the liquidity of
subprime loans because of fears of latent risks and therefore
expanded the scope and duration of the crisis in the long run.147
Rating agencies have had incentives to legitimize financial
instruments of increasing complexity by understating the risks
involved.148 This fact has reinforced fears that the subprime mortgage
crisis may only be the tip of an iceberg in a debt-driven financial
world in which ratings camouflage reckless risk taking.149 Rating
agencies’ actions during this crisis suggest that creditors can take little
comfort from ratings, which underscores the need for greater
accountability.150
D. Responsibility Without Accountability in the Rating Agency
Context
The current gatekeeping role of rating agencies can be
summarized as responsibility without accountability, which poses a
stark moral hazard for financial markets. This problem is a product
of weak reputational constraints, the leverage rating agencies enjoy
over issuers, conflicts of interest to favor issuers, and rating agencies’
virtual immunity from liability.151

147. The rating agencies’ inaction has magnified the impact of other government
policies allowing banks to minimize accounting write-downs from the subprime mortgage
crisis.
See, e.g., Jonathan Weil, Subprime Lenders Get Big Accounting Break,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039
&sid=aPSScH5rRBLM&refer=home (discussing how the SEC has granted holders of
subprime mortgage debt instruments an “exemption from the normal rules for offbalance-sheet-accounting” allowing them to exclude most of the write-downs from
anticipated losses).
148. See JUSTIN PETIT, UBS, THE NEW WORLD OF CREDIT RATINGS 2–3 (2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=593522 (describing the
shifts among issuers toward more aggressive financial policies that entailed the embrace of
increasingly complex financial instruments with greater risks).
149. See Julie Creswell, A Nervous Wall Street Seems Unsure What’s Next, N.Y TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2008, at C1 (discussing how fears of latent risks are undermining faith in the
integrity of the financial system).
150. See Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis, supra note 20, at 206
(executives from rating agencies acknowledging that rating agencies have suffered
“serious reputational damage”).
151. See, e.g., Dieter Kerwer, Holding Global Regulators Accountable: The Case of
Credit Rating Agencies, 18 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS, 453,
455 (2005) (observing that “there seems to be a persistent mismatch between demand and
supply of accountability” in the context of rating agencies).
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1. The Absence of Reputational Constraints
In the absence of a credible threat of liability, the sole incentive
for rating agencies to fulfill screening roles is their reputation.152
Rating agencies have long embraced the mantle of reputational
intermediaries because their economic interest purportedly lies in
their accuracy in assessing corporate debt offerings for
creditworthiness.153 For this reason, rating agencies have claimed that
imposing liability on their malfeasance may simply raise the financial
exposure of gatekeepers,154 yet have little effect on heightening
incentives for accurate assessments of risk.155
In reality, the power of reputational constraints appears far
weaker than rating agencies claim. Not only do reputational concerns
wane for all securities-related actors amidst bubble markets
(ironically just when they are needed the most), but also the past
generation has witnessed a significant shift in the risk-seeking
behavior of participants in financial markets that has dampened the
force of reputational constraints.156 The pendulum may eventually
swing when market bubbles inevitably burst and the search for blame
begins. Nonetheless, attempts by rating agencies to defuse backlashes
through acknowledgments of shortcomings or minor changes to their

152. Policymakers can expect gatekeeper compliance, so long as the expected value of
the reputational costs from getting caught not performing their gatekeeping role
outweighs the marginal returns from casting a blind eye to wrongdoing. See Black, supra
note 41, at 787 (arguing that reputational intermediaries are “repeat players who will
suffer a reputational loss, if they let a company falsify or unduly exaggerate its prospects,
that exceeds their one-time gain from permitting the exaggeration”); see also Reinier
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J.
857, 898 & n.124 (1984) (describing how reputational intermediaries may face analogous
incentives to publicly imposed gatekeeper liability because these intermediaries “place
established reputations on the line”); Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 752
(2004) (arguing that “in the long-run, reputational intermediaries will commit fraud if the
risk is acceptable either for the firm or its agents”).
153. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 26 (arguing that rating agencies’ “reputational
motivation is sufficient” and that “[a]dditional regulation of rating agencies thus would
impose unnecessary costs and thereby diminish efficiency”).
154. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 31 at 296–98 (arguing that the reputational costs
that accountants may face from failing to detect wrongdoing gives them adequate
incentives to monitor their clients); see also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that an accountant’s concern for her reputation and exposure to
potential loss would make collusion with her clients’ accounting fraud irrational).
155. To the extent to which gatekeeper liability would burden rating agencies with
liabilities that these actors could not screen for (or only at prohibitive cost), gatekeeper
liability may have the perverse effect of raising the costs of their services or causing them
to exit the market.
156. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1408–09.
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approaches should not obscure the fact that reputational pressures
may swiftly fade.
The weakness of reputational constraints is partly a product of
the nature of ratings. Rating agencies can hide behind their own
approaches to assessing risk in a bucket system of categories whose
opaqueness lends itself to being used as a cover for inaccuracy.
Rating agencies enjoy the almost elastic ability to spin their failures as
a product of the short-sightedness and knee-jerk reactions of
markets,157 because ratings focus on structural, long-term concerns.158
The degree of truth behind these claims may blunt the force of
reputational constraints.
As will be discussed below, another part of the problem is that
issuers simply have nowhere else to turn under the current system and
have little incentive to exert reputational pressures in the face of lax
ratings. The combination of regulatory mandates for issuers to secure
ratings and the dominance of a handful of rating agencies means that
an oligopolistic group of rating agencies has a virtual lock on the
market and faces little potential for pushback based on reputational
concerns. Issuers have little interest in encouraging rating agencies to
pop market bubbles.159 Creditors have greater incentives to exert
reputational pressures because they bear the consequences of ratings
inaccuracies, yet these pressures have proven ineffective except to a
limited extent in the immediate aftermath of financial crises.
The irony is that rating agencies’ reputations have served as a
cover to paper over their noncompliance with gatekeeping roles.160
As a result, the outspoken reliance of rating agencies on reputational

157. See, e.g., David Evans, Moody’s Implied Ratings Show MBIA, Ambac Turn to
Junk, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 30, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=a0tWb0sTTgu8&refer=home (discussing how Moody’s has sought to
rationalize the gap between market-based indicators of the financial health of bond
insurers MBIA and Ambac and its actual ratings).
158. Cantor & Mann, supra note 89, at 15 (discussing the emphasis on long-term
concerns in determining ratings through “fundamental credit analysis”).
159. The SEC has recently proposed new rules to deemphasize the significance of
rating agencies by formally removing the requirement of NRSRO ratings in a variety of
contexts. See SEC 2008 Proposed Rules, supra note 13. But regardless of whether these
proposed rules are implemented, ratings will continue to play a central role in identifying
credit risk and entrenched market practices of soliciting and relying upon ratings are likely
to sustain the significance of rating agencies. See SEC Issues Rules of Conflicts in Credit
Rating, supra note 14.
160. See, e.g., Richard House, Ratings Trouble, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR., Oct. 1995,
at 245 (quoting Moody’s former president as stating: “We’re in the integrity business:
People pay us to be objective, to be independent and to forcefully tell it like it is.”).
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constraints appears to have served more as a pretense to avoid
regulation than as an effective incentive for gatekeeper compliance.161
2. The Market Power of Rating Agencies
Other securities intermediaries also appear to have become lax in
the face of waning reputational constraints. However, reinvigorating
the role of rating agencies as gatekeepers poses distinct challenges
from other securities intermediaries because of the market power and
autonomy of rating agencies, their virtual immunity from suit, and
potential conflicts of interest. The most salient difference is the
market power that rating agencies enjoy, which is a product of
history, the almost duopolistic dominance of Moody’s and Standard
& Poor’s (“S&P”), and regulatory barriers to entry.162
Like
accounting firms, the dominant rating agencies form a virtual
oligopoly whose specialized skills are indispensable for access to
capital markets.163 The concentration of power in the ratings world,
however, is far deeper than that of the “Big Four” accounting firms,
as two firms, Moody’s and S&P, form a near duopoly in dominating
161. In practice, reputational markets appear inefficient as reputational intermediaries
in the securities markets have repeatedly demonstrated by their failures over the past
decade. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 311–18 (documenting the failures of reputational
intermediaries in securities law compliance); Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for
Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 366–37 (2004); see also
Black, supra note 41, at 787–89 (arguing that true reputational intermediaries cannot fulfill
their role in vouching for disclosure quality and thus reducing information asymmetry in
securities markets because of the ability of false reputational intermediaries to free-ride
off of true reputational intermediaries’ credibility and to provide false or misleading
information on securities).
162. References to the almost “duopolistic” dominance of Moody’s and S&P or the
“oligopolistic” nature of the rating agency industry (when one also takes into account
Fitch’s) might understandably make the reader think that antitrust law should be enlisted
to counter rating agencies’ market power. See, e.g., Lynn Hume, Connecticut AG Sues All
3 Rating Agencies, BOND BUYER, July 31, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.bondbuyer.com/article/html?id=200807307EFUPEHX&queryid=26149517&hi
tnum=49 (discussing the Connecticut Attorney General’s lawsuit against the three largest
rating agencies alleging unfair and deceptive practices in rating municipal bonds and
violations of state antitrust laws). However, to date, antitrust actions against rating
agencies have proven to be unsuccessful. More importantly, as the following discussion
underscores, under the current system the barriers to entry are so significant that it is
unclear whether a successful antitrust action would do much to dislodge the dominance of
the leading rating agencies.
163. The fallout from the accounting crises of the 1980s led to a winnowing out of the
accounting industry to the “Big Four” of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG, which share similar revenues that far outstrip
their diminutive competitors. See O’Connor, supra note 102, at 788–89 (discussing the
evolution of the Big Four accounting firms into the dominant players in the accounting
industry).
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the ratings business (with Fitch’s a distant third and other participants
holding marginal market shares).164 While each corporation typically
retains one accounting firm, which leaves room for competition, the
industry standard is for two rating agencies to opine on each debt
issue in the United States. Moody’s rates all but a small percentage of
new debt issues, and S&P is not far behind.165
The oligopolistic dominance of Moody’s and S&P did not arise
by accident, but was in part a product of their building demand for
their brands and products over decades and their outmaneuvering
and acquiring smaller rivals.166 But starting in 1975, the federal
government and the SEC reinforced the barriers to entry for rating
agencies by officially enlisting them as gatekeepers of risk through the
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”)
system.167 Numerous federal and state laws and regulations made
NRSRO ratings a sine qua non for distinguishing among grades of
creditworthiness in activities ranging from money markets to bond
insurance.168 Even international regulations, such as the Basel II
accord, have made ratings a cornerstone of risk management in
financial markets.169
For much of this period, NRSRO status has been a virtual
tautology as the SEC has recognized that “[t]he single most important
criterion is that the rating agency is widely accepted in the U.S. as an
issuer of credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of
securities ratings.”170 If no rating agency could be recognized as a
NRSRO unless it was “widely accepted,” in practice this standard
meant only the existing dominant firms could hope to achieve this
status. Legislation in 2006 has partly opened the gates for new
entrants by introducing a more open NRSRO certification process,
which may lead to greater rating agency competition in the long
run.171 The market power of the rating agencies, however, does not

164. See Reiss, supra note 15, at 1020–21 (discussing the oligopolistic nature of the
ratings industry).
165. See S. REP. NO. 109-326, at 3–4 (2006).
166. See Hill, supra note 15, at 46–48.
167. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 6, at 35,258.
168. Id.; see also Partnoy, supra note 15, at 74–78 (describing the increase in ratingsbased statutory provisions and regulation).
169. See Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 122 (2008).
170. NRSRO status was previously achieved in practice through the SEC’s no-action
letter process. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 6, at 35,258.
171. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327, 1327–29 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, and 23 U.S.C.).
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turn on their regulatory imprimatur alone.172 As will be discussed
below, rating agencies have many weapons at their disposal to
maintain a stranglehold on the ratings marketplace regardless of
whether other entities are formally awarded NRSRO status.
3. The Inherent Conflicts of Interest in Relationships Between
Rating Agencies and Issuers
In addition to market power, rating agencies also enjoy a
symbiotic relationship with their issuer clients that may compromise
their objectivity. An inherent conflict of interest exists since issuers
pay rating agencies to monitor them, because the gatekeepers are
paid by the very actors that may burst through the gates of financial
propriety. This fact means that rating agencies may have incentives
to give the companies they are monitoring the benefit of the doubt or
not to push for additional information for fear of jeopardizing their
relationship.173 This concern may be especially prominent in shaping
the reluctance of rating agencies to downgrade ratings as shifts from
investment to non-investment grade ratings could lead to a cascade
effect of market reactions and contractual obligation triggers that
could significantly harm issuers’ financial status.174
The problem of potential rating agency bias is magnified by
lucrative consulting relationships between issuers and rating agencies,
which raise red flags of potential conflict of interests.175 What passes
for efforts to strengthen the internal procedures of issuers and ratings
disclosures may easily serve as a cover for implicit payoffs between
the monitored and the monitors.176
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
172. For a contrary view that solely emphasizes the significance of regulatory barriers
to entry, see Partnoy, supra note 3, at 681–82 (“[C]redit ratings are valuable not because
they contain valuable information, but because they grant issuers ‘regulatory licenses.’. . .
[O]nce regulation is passed that incorporates ratings, rating agencies begin to sell not only
information but also the valuable property rights associated with compliance with that
regulation.”).
173. See Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Rating Agencies: Is There an Agency Issue?, in
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 289, 302–04
(Richard M. Levich ed., 2002) (discussing the potential for rating agencies to compete by
offering more favorable ratings to issuers than other rating agencies).
174. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both of Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 342–43 (2003) (discussing the reluctance of rating agencies to
downgrade their issuer clients because of concerns about the far-reaching effects of
downgrades).
175. See Hill, supra note 15, at 50–52 (discussing the potential for consulting revenues
to impair rating agency objectivity).
176. Rating agencies have erected formal walls of separation between these different
segments of their business to dampen the salience of the conflicts, but the potential for
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recognized how the allure of consulting fees on top of accounting fees
could ensnare accountants in conflicts of interests with their clients
and therefore abolished these potential side payoffs.177 Adopting a
similar reform for rating agencies could dampen incentives to
compromise their integrity for the sake of their pocketbooks.178 But
even in the absence of express consulting fees, issuers will still have a
strong interest in tilting the scales of ratings in their favor. So long as
issuers finance rating agencies, rating agencies will continue to have
incentives to minimize screening and to do their part to ensure that
their business with issuers continues to grow.
4. The Use of Unsolicited Ratings to Induce Issuer Loyalty
Rating agencies also have ready weapons at their disposal to
ensure the loyalty of their issuer clients, a fact which underscores the
scope of rating agencies’ autonomy and market power. Moody’s and
S&P already profit from the fact that they serve as a “gold standard”
for ratings and that the omission of ratings from these rating agencies
may be interpreted as a reflection of the quality of a debt issue.179 But
conflicts is clear. See SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 43 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/ studies/credratingreport0103.pdf; see also STANDARD & POOR’S
RATING SERVICES, CODE OF CONDUCT 6–7 (2007), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/
spf/pdf/fixedincome/SP_RatingsServicesCodeOfConduct_June2007.pdf (describing the
procedures put in place to separate the rating and consulting portions of S&P’s business).
177. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
178. Rule 17g-5 requires disclosure of ancillary consulting services provided for rated
companies, but the SEC has not moved to ban these services as a conflict of interest. See
17 C.F.R. § 240-17g-5 (2008) (implementing provisions of the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006); see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 6, at 35,258 (recognizing
the concern about conflicts of interests from rating agencies’ ancillary consulting services).
Similarly, a recently proposed settlement between the New York Attorney General’s
Office and rating agencies has called for greater transparency in having rating agencies
charge for each stage of the rating process and disclose all companies they were asked to
rate, even if the issuer chose to hire another rating agency. See Jenny Anderson & Vikas
Bajaj, Rating Firms Seem Near Legal Deals on Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at C1.
179. See, e.g., Floyd Norris: Notions of High and Low Finance, If You Don’t Like
Your Grade, Fire the Teacher, http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/if-you-dont-likeyour-grade-fire-the-teacher/ (Mar. 8, 2008, 11:35 EST) (discussing how the absence of one
of the key rating agencies may be interpreted as a signal of excessive risk exposure or
other issuer problems). This point is analogous to the power of the “Big Four” accounting
firms as Fortune 1000 companies may fear that using a smaller auditor who offers cheaper
services could be viewed as signaling to the market that they have potential accounting
issues. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AUDITS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES:
CONTINUED CONCENTRATION IN AUDIT MARKET FOR LARGE PUBLIC COMPANIES
DOES NOT CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, GAO-08-163, at 20–22 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08163.pdf (explaining the views of Fortune 1000
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Moody’s, in particular, attempts to assert market influence even when
it is not paid by issuing unsolicited (and unpaid) ratings covering
much of the small percentage of ratings it is not paid to cover.180 This
practice might sound innocuous at first glance because it serves to
provide more information for creditors to make investment decisions.
But in practice, unsolicited ratings may serve as a veiled threat against
issuers who do not pay for their services.181 Since unsolicited ratings
by definition can only be based on what information is publicly
available, they appear likely to be lower than solicited ratings because
of conservative assumptions concerning nonpublic information. The
potential financial impact from the threat of low ratings may serve to
deter issuers who may be tempted to go elsewhere with their
business.182
This threat not only functions as an offensive weapon to threaten
issuers into cooperation with the dominant rating agencies, but also it
serves as a defensive tactic. By issuing unsolicited ratings, Moody’s
can more plausibly claim it is a purveyor of opinion, rather than a
hired gun of issuers. This appearance of journalistic neutrality may
help to support rating agencies’ arguments that they deserve to be
shielded from liability exposure on First Amendment grounds.183
5. The Virtual Immunity Enjoyed by Rating Agencies
Rating agencies are not only free from accountability to issuers,
but also enjoy virtual immunity from any other stakeholders.184
Rating agencies have long waged campaigns inside and outside of
courtrooms claiming that their ratings are journalistic opinions
protected by the First Amendment. Issuers can claim that a rating
agency’s report constitutes libel, alleging that the ratings constitute
companies on why the Big Four Accounting firms control ninety-eight percent of the
Fortune 1000 firms’ audit market).
180. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 79.
181. See S. REP. NO. 109-326, at 3 (2006).
182. See Alec Klein, Spitzer Examining Debt Ratings by Moody’s, WASH. POST, July
30, 2005, at D1 (discussing how Moody’s issued unsolicited ratings of Hannover Re, a
German reinsurer, after the company refused to hire Moody’s and detailing how the
issuance of a below investment grade ratings resulted in $175 million in losses).
183. This practice has been upheld as constitutional in spite of the potential for the
threat of unsolicited ratings to serve as a cover for pay to play extortion on the part of
rating agencies. See, e.g., Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Serv.,
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding unsolicited rating as protected opinion
in case where Moody’s issued negative rating for bond issue after school district passed
over Moody’s in favor of other rating agencies).
184. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 78 (discussing how rating agencies are largely
immune to civil liability).
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assertions of facts rather than protected opinions.185 It is possible that
rating agency reports may include opinions intertwined with false
facts that may be sufficient to overcome the presumption of First
Amendment protection.
The problem, however, is that issuers are generally treated as
public figures for First Amendment purposes and must show that the
rating agencies relied on falsehoods because of actual malice and had
actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of their
claims.186 This First Amendment hurdle has made it extraordinarily
difficult to establish that rating agencies engaged in libel and has left
issuers without legal recourse except in outlier cases. Courts have
come out on both sides of the question of whether ratings universally
enjoy First Amendment protection, but issuers still face significant
hurdles in pinning liability on the shoulders of rating agencies.187
What is clear is that rating agencies face little to no accountability to
issuers and generally have no liability exposure to creditors or other
financial market participants.188 Rating agencies appear to have a free
hand in issuing ratings (whether solicited or unsolicited), so long as
they have established some basis for their ratings.

185. See Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the
United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 352–54 (2006).
186. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1688–92 (2008).
187. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985)
(noting in dicta that the commercial nature of rating agencies “speech” suggests that it
does not require heightened First Amendment protection); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,
210 n.58 (1985) (noting in dicta that “it is difficult to see why the expression of opinion
about a marketable security should not also be protected”); Quinn v. McGraw Hill Co.,
Inc., 168 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal for failing to state a claim,
where plaintiff could not show the reasonableness in relying on the rating of the agency);
Newby v. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d. 742, 818–19 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that ratings
enjoyed “qualified” First Amendment protection in a case alleging rating agencies failed
to exercise reasonable care in changing their ratings because they had rated Enron’s debt
as investment-grade in December, 2000); In re Pan Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 580
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that rating agencies are protected by the First Amendment in
spite of their profit motive). But see In re Fitch, 330 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (distinguishing rating agency functions from that of a journalist for First
Amendment purposes); Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 324 F. Supp.
2d 860, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that ratings are protected under a state reporter
privilege statute); Am. Sav. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., No. M8-85, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24102, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2002) (rejecting a rating agency’s claims of
entitlement to “journalist privilege” protections for its ratings).
188. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG.,
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WATCHDOGS 105
(2002); 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2008) (exempting rating agencies from potential liability
exposure based on the role of ratings in the registration process).
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Agents in Search of a Principal
1. The Federal Government’s Role in Transforming Issuers into
Nominal Principals

As the discussion of conflicts of interest has highlighted, issuers
paradoxically serve as the nominal principal over the rating agencies
that assess their credit risk. Two issues merit attention, how this
relationship arose, and how fundamentally flawed it has become,
because government policy, rather than markets, led to this
development. The irony is that rating agencies historically served as
agents to prospective purchasers and owners of debt. Rating agencies
arose through subscription businesses that marketed their services
toward creditors.189 The businesses were created as vehicles to
minimize creditor risks, and the debt issues that rating agencies chose
to review were based on their economic value to their creditor clients.
Starting in 1975, the federal government and the SEC initiated a
fundamental transformation in how rating agencies conduct business,
which has had far-reaching effects in terms of rating agency
accountability.190 By mandating that issuers secure the services of at
least one NRSRO rating agency (which as a matter of market practice
swiftly developed into securing the services of at least two rating
agencies), the federal government effectively turned the market for
ratings upside down.191 In a rapid period of time, the targets of rating
agencies became the clients, and the erstwhile customers became the
targets of information rather than the customers. Through an ever
increasing number of laws, rules, and regulations that tied NRSRO
ratings to the ability of issuers to issue debt, the federal government
and the SEC changed the landscape of debt offerings to make issuerpurchased ratings a virtual necessity.192
The virtue of these rules and regulations is that they transformed
ratings into a de facto public good. This change was a beneficial step
for the marketplace in that both small and large debt offerings had to
pass by the eyes of rating agency gatekeepers. But policymakers did
not anticipate the consequences of flipping accountability from
creditors to issuers. The combination of the market power of rating
189. See Furchtgott-Roth, et al., supra note 83, at 76–77 (providing an overview of the
historical development of subscription-based rating agencies).
190. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-1 (2008) (authorizing NRSRO ratings to be used in
implementing the net capital requirements for broker dealers).
191. See Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1146–
47 (2003) (describing the requirements issuers face in securing ratings).
192. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 6, at 2.
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agencies and the conflicts of interest inherent in the relationship
between rating agencies and issuers left rating agencies
unaccountable.
2. 2006 Legislation: A Failed Attempt to Make the SEC the Locus of
Accountability
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (the “2006 Act”)
sought to narrow the accountability gap between rating agencies and
creditors by shifting the locus of rating agency accountability to the
SEC.193 The irony is that Congress’s “solution” to the problem came
on the eve of the subprime mortgage financial crisis, yet this law’s
inadequacies did little to nothing to address the underlying problems
of a lack of gatekeeper accountability. The 2006 Act sought to foster
accountability, transparency, and competition among rating agencies.
Few could quarrel with these laudable goals, but it is easy to find fault
with the half-measures that were put in place to further these
objectives.
The 2006 Act asserted the SEC’s authority over NRSRO
registration and oversight, delineated the criteria for NRSRO
certification, and mandated greater disclosure of ratings
methodologies and conflicts of interest.194 The one significant reform
entailed opening the door for new entrants into the field of rating
agencies by creating a more clear process and criteria for recognition
of NRSROs. But while this reform may spur greater competition in
the long run, it does not change the market power that the dominant
rating agencies currently enjoy. The mere fact that other entrants
may enter into the rating agency market may mean little given the
ability of the dominant rating agencies to pressure issuers to retain
their services.195
As significantly, while the 2006 Act spoke of greater oversight of
rating agencies, it fell far short of its aspirations as it does not create
any meaningful accountability for rating agencies. The 2006 Act’s
approach falls within the scope of the free-market-driven reforms of
the last generation in relying on transparency as an ostensible elixir
and nominal oversight by the SEC that lacks teeth.196 Taking the first
193. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327, 1327–29 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, and 23 U.S.C.).
194. Id.
195. See supra Part II.D.
196. This approach parallels the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s creation of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), whose mandate includes “establish[ing] . . .
auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the
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step toward greater competition among rating agencies and clarifying
the SEC’s oversight role represents progress, but policymakers
sidestepped more meaningful reforms.
Recently proposed SEC rules have sought to heighten
transparency in the ratings process and to curb some of the most
abusive rating agency practices that fueled the subprime mortgage
crisis.197 But instead of tackling the deeper challenges of rating
agency accountability, the SEC has also proposed trying to legislate
the problem away by rolling back the extent to which SEC rules
require issuers to secure ratings.198 The degree to which these
changes would alter market reliance on ratings is an open question.
The irony of this approach, however, is that the SEC appears to be
embracing a philosophy of caveat emptor at a time when the failures
of rating agencies have underscored the importance of rating
agencies’ accurate and timely screening of risk to the health of
financial markets. The SEC’s approach may be understandable given
the inadequacies of public oversight of rating agencies, yet it
overlooks the fact that creditors may be equipped with the potential
means to hold rating agencies accountable.
3. The Plight Facing Creditors
Under the current system creditors rely on ratings for assessing
issuer creditworthiness, yet are left out of the equation when it comes
to any ability to hold rating agencies accountable.199 Creditors rely on
the accuracy of rating agencies in making investment decisions, and
rating agencies’ assessments of default risk may directly impact their
bottom line. For example, distinctions between investment-grade and
non-investment grade debt and other indicators of default-risk help

preparation of audit reports for issuers.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7211(c)(2) (2006). But while the PCAOB has some tools at its disposal to enforce its
mandate, the SEC is vested with responsibility to regulate rating agencies, yet lacks the
means to uphold its oversight role.
197. See, e.g., Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,211 (proposed June 25, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240 and 249b), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf; SEC,
supra note 12, at 4–5.
198. See SEC 2008 Proposed Rules, supra note 13. However, the SEC has opted in the
short term to focus on addressing rating agencies’ conflicts of interests and heightening
transparency and has not implemented the proposed rules on removing requirements for
ratings. See SEC Issues Rules on Conflicts in Credit Rating, supra note 14.
199. See Unterman, supra note 169, at 121–22 (describing how pension funds are
required by law to hold debt that is at least investment grade).
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creditors determine the risks they are assuming.200 While large banks
may supplement ratings with input from in-house or other
independent analysts, the reliance interest appears at its strongest in
the case of smaller creditors who may have fewer alternatives to
ratings.
In spite of the interest of creditors in ensuring that rating
agencies perform their job accurately, the lack of any relationship
between rating agencies and creditors means that rating agencies owe
creditors no duties. The actors with the greatest interest in holding
rating agencies accountable are left holding the bag when rating
agencies are asleep at the wheel and defaults occur without any
warning from the gatekeepers. While government requirements for
ratings pursued a worthy end of expanding the coverage of ratings, by
transforming issuers into employers of rating agencies, this mandate
removed the financial linkage between rating agencies and creditors
and the potential for accountability created by subscription-based
services.201 Restoring a system of financial accountability between
creditors and rating agencies has the potential to give creditors
incentives to monitor rating agencies and to hold rating agencies
accountable for their failures.
III. A USER FEE APPROACH TO HEIGHTEN RATING AGENCY
ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Desirability of Preserving Ratings as a Public Good
Turning back the clock to a world in which rating agencies were
accountable to creditors could be as simple as eliminating the
requirements that issuers secure NRSRO ratings.202 Given the SEC’s
recently proposed rules to scale back requirements for ratings, this is
more than a merely theoretical question.203 However, market
practices and contractual relations have developed around the
provision of ratings, and issuers would likely feel strong pressures to

200. Issuing public “ratings” of the rating agencies’ performance represents the closest
creditors have come in seeking to heighten rating agency accountability. See Jody Shenn,
Moody’s is Least Accurate Subprime-Bond Rating Firm, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 2, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=abqrFE4LNOd4&refer=home
(discussing UBS’ ranking of rating agencies based on their accuracy in rating subprime
debt).
201. See Kerwer, supra note 151, at 466.
202. Furchtgott-Roth et al., supra note 83, at 76–77 (providing an overview of the
historical development of subscription-based rating agencies).
203. See, e.g., SEC 2008 Proposed Rules, supra note 13.
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continue to secure ratings even in the absence of federal, state, and
international mandates.204
One virtue of shifting to a ratings world centering on
subscriptions is that it would open up the door to more meaningful
competition. As noted earlier, the 2006 Act enabled new rating
agencies to acquire NRSRO status more easily, yet the dominance of
the market leaders may make this amount to a hollow opportunity.205
But in a subscription-driven world, smaller rating agencies and new
entrants would not face an all or nothing game of being one of two
rating agencies of a given issuer, a status that may be hard to win
because they are not as established. Instead, smaller rating agencies
and new entrants could target their efforts on securing creditor clients
and on tailoring their coverage and rating styles to fit clients’ needs.206
This decentralized approach to ratings would also potentially
heighten the value of ratings because ratings would be private (at
least to the pool of a given rating agency’s subscribers).
The downside of a subscription approach is that it would
eliminate the one significant contribution of government rating
requirements, which was to make ratings become a public good
providing near comprehensive coverage of debt offerings.207 Ratings
squarely fit within understandings of what constitutes a public good.
First, the “consumption” of ratings is nonrival, that is, once the good
is produced, there is no marginal cost to expand its scope of
proliferation. Second, nonpayers of ratings cannot easily be excluded
from gaining access to this information, as once a rating is issued, it
becomes widely disseminated.208
The fundamental challenge facing public goods is that in the
absence of government intervention, the good will either not be
produced or it will only be produced and disseminated for those who
can afford it.209 The necessity of managing credit risk means that
ratings would continue to be produced, at least for those parties who
204. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 7–8 (discussing the scope of market reliance on
ratings).
205. See infra Part II.D.2.
206. See Creswell & Bajaj, supra note 112; Gretchen Morgenson, Wanted: Credit
Ratings. Objective Ones, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, § 3 (Business), at 1 (discussing
how Egan-Jones adopted this strategy of targeting on particular market sectors and
building its business through subscription sales prior to being recognized as an NRSRO
rating agency).
207. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 8–10.
208. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 718–20 (1986) (providing an overview
of what is generally understood to constitute public goods).
209. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 16, at 802–03.
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could afford it, even in the absence of a government mandate. But a
subscription approach could enhance the disparity between the haves
and the have-nots of financial information. While large banks may
have the financial means to pay for rating agencies’ subscription
services or to create in-house equivalents,210 smaller creditors would
face difficult choices concerning whether to sign up for rating
subscriptions or to rely on other proxies of risk. Alternatively, to the
extent that ratings would still become leaked to the public, the quality
and supply of this information may be affected as rating agencies may
have less economic incentive to invest in diligence to perform their
gatekeeping role.211
B.

The Merits of a User Fee Approach

An SEC-administered user fee system has the potential to
overcome the shortcomings of both the current “issuer pays” system
and subscription-based alternatives. A user fee system would address
collective action problems in financing ratings and coordinating the
monitoring efforts of debt purchasers to avoid needless overlap of
both gatekeepers and oversight. It would also provide leverage for
eroding the dominance of rating agencies by consolidating demand
for ratings and creating a bidding process for rating agencies to serve
as screeners for debt issues.
1. The Contours of an SEC-Administered User Fee System
The creation and administration of a user fee system would
necessarily entail a more active government role in the ratings
process. The simplest means would be to have the SEC (or a subagency)212 serve as the administrator of a user fee system for creditors
to finance the solicitation of ratings through a competitive bidding
process.
One virtue of a user fee approach is the ability to overcome
coordination problems among creditors, which market-based
approaches may not be able to address.213 For example, prior to the
issuance of debt, each potential creditor would have an interest in
210. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 59, at 1041 (discussing the role of in-house analysts at
banks).
211. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 16, at 803.
212. The new sub-agency could be called the Ratings Accountability Division or
“RAD,” a potentially colorful name for a somber field.
213. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 861–68 (1982) (discussing the collective action
problems that face creditors outside of bankruptcy).
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securing accurate ratings, yet there may be little incentive for
potential creditors to pool resources because they may have widely
disparate interests. In contrast, after debt is purchased, creditors
would share a more uniform interest in securing accurate ratings to
gauge their credit exposure and may have greater incentives to work
together to ensure ratings are regularly reviewed and updated. This
self-interest may arise too late in the credit process as creditors need
both to secure ratings prior to the issuance of debt and throughout
the life of the debt.214
A user fee system could resolve this gap by creating a mechanism
to pool creditors’ resources to secure ratings before debt is issued.215
The SEC would be in the position to leverage the centralization of
demand for ratings to contain the costs of ratings and to require
rating agencies to assume greater responsibilities as a condition of
winning the bid. The use of a pay-as-you-go approach would allow
the SEC to solicit ratings prior to the issuance of debt and then to pay
for these expenses and related administrative costs through a user fee
imposed on the purchasers of the debt. Popular images of pay-asyou-go systems have been distorted by debates over Social Security
and Medicare where the demographic gap between recipients and a
declining pool of contributors has raised questions about these
programs’ financial viability.216 In contrast, both the costs and the
creditor beneficiaries of debt offerings would be easily identifiable in
any given case. The costs of ratings could be recouped within a very
short time frame after the initial ratings are issued (rather than many
years later as in the case of social welfare programs). In cases where
companies fail to issue rated debt at the eleventh hour, the SEC could
be empowered to impose the user fee on the issuers themselves since
in those cases they would be the only readily identifiable beneficiaries
of information on their creditworthiness.
User fees could be financed by imposing a flat fraction of a
percentage fee on the initial purchases of debt offerings to finance
ratings and the SEC’s administrative fees for soliciting and overseeing
rating agencies.217 This approach would mirror the current system in

214. See Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 253–54.
215. See Reynolds, supra note 16, at 380 (discussing how user fees are imposed in local
government contexts well before consumption of the underlying good or service).
216. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, RETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE: TRUE SECURITY 5–18 (1999) (providing an overview of the merits
and shortcomings of the current pay-as-you-go systems of social insurance).
217. The conventional approach in most user fee contexts is for the user fee to
approximate the opportunity cost for producing the good, and the combination of the cost
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which issuers typically pay rating agencies a fee of three to four basis
points (i.e., three or four hundredths of a percent) of the face amount
of the debt offering.218 The SEC could finance ratings on a rolling
basis with the ratings for a given debt issue being secured before the
issuance of the debt. Then the SEC could recoup these expenses
through a set ratings user fee on the initial purchasers or a smaller
user fee that applies to both initial purchase and subsequent resales.
For reasons of simplicity in administration and monitoring it would
likely prove easier to have a one-time fee at the initial sale which is
designed to cover the lifetime of ratings for the debt.
2. The Tradeoff Between Price Competition Bidding and Cost-Based
Government Contracting
One of the most significant challenges facing the user fee system
would be delineating the criteria for a competitive bidding process.
The bidding process would potentially serve three functions:
containing the costs for ratings through price competition, eroding the
dominance of a handful of rating agencies by leveling the playing field
for smaller competitors and new entrants, and balancing the
desirability of market-based assessments of risk with a greater role for
the SEC in defining rating agencies’ responsibilities.219
The simplest approach would be to have bidding based solely on
the price of the rating agencies’ services with the SEC selecting the
lowest bidder who also meets the SEC’s requirements to serve as a
NRSRO (and any other conditions that the SEC details ex ante).220
The virtue of this approach is administrative efficiency as it would
allow the SEC to process a myriad of bids for rating debt issues in
short order. By centralizing market demand for ratings, the user fee
system could leverage that power to secure ratings at lower cost.
Rating agencies would be repeat players in their interaction with the
SEC because they would not only be rating existing debt issues, but
also would be making bids for new debt issues on an ongoing basis.
Ratings agencies would therefore have significant incentives to assess
risks accurately for fear of potentially facing limits on future bids.

of private bids from rating agencies plus the administrative costs of running the user fee
system would approximate this figure. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 16, at 796–99.
218. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 72.
219. See Competition in Contracting Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253 (2000) (laying out the
scope and nature of competitive government contracting processes).
220. See VERNON J. EDWARDS, SOURCE SELECTION ANSWER BOOK 11–12 (2000)
(discussing the default rules for price competition in government contracting).
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The potential concern about this approach is that price
competition may create perverse incentives for underinvestment in
actual diligence of issuer risks. Rating agencies may be tempted to
invest as little as possible in assessing issuers while grading them
harshly to create the appearance that they are more thoroughly
scrutinizing risks. This concern would be mitigated by the enactment
of substantive certification and mandatory reporting duties for rating
agencies, as well as the check of potential liability exposure to
creditors for gross negligence or the threat of informal sanctions
imposed by the SEC for negligence.221 Much of the success of bidding
based solely on price would ultimately turn on the degree of efficacy
of the SEC and creditors in monitoring rating agencies’ conduct.
The other alternative would be to utilize a cost-based
government contracting method for the bidding process.222 This
approach envisions rating agencies competing not merely on price but
also on the types and extent of diligence they propose to undertake in
assessing a class of debt, as well as on the types of diligence and
disclosures they would demand from issuers as a condition for ratings.
While a cost-based approach may prove to be more expensive, one of
the problems raised by the subprime crisis is the systematic
underinvestment in risk assessment.223 Therefore, shifting from a
world in which three of four basis points (i.e., hundredths of a
percent) of the value of debt are dedicated to rating risks to one in
which marginally higher investments are made to scrutinize risks
could be a tradeoff that is worth making. Rating agencies already lay
out their qualitative and quantitative methodologies to debt issuers,
and it would not be a huge leap to have them delineate the diligence
steps that they would be making or imposing on issuers as a condition
for granting ratings. A cost-based approach would seek to weave
market-based approaches into assessing risk with a regulator’s
discretion in shaping the criteria for rating. Since the SEC may face
difficulties anticipating distinctive risks posed by new forms of debt
on its own, a cost-based approach would give the SEC flexibility to
shape risk management without resorting to direct regulations.

221. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
222. See Stephanie A. Dunne & Mark A. Loewenstein, Costly Verification of Cost
Performance and the Competition for Incentive Contracts, 26 RAND J. ECON. 690, 691–93
(1995) (detailing the features of cost-based government contracting and discussing the
challenges and costs of monitoring compliance with cost-based contracts).
223. See Bajaj, supra note 4 (discussing how attributions of blame have sought to cover
the absence of effective risk management during the bubble market).
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The potential Achilles’ heel of a cost-based approach is the
question of whether the SEC would be well equipped to choose
between rating agencies’ competing approaches.
Part of the
challenge would be addressing the sheer number of debt issues as the
SEC could easily be overwhelmed in time-intensive efforts to assess
cost-based bids by rating agencies and to monitor the results. But
even putting aside concerns about the SEC’s ability to process large
numbers of bids, the larger issue is that the SEC may be far better
positioned to select low bidders and to set floors for rating agency
diligence than to engage in more difficult and subjective choices
concerning what rating agency approaches are preferable.
Concerns about administrability suggest the desirability of having
the bidding process center on price competition. However, in
selecting the lowest bidders, the SEC could still simultaneously
require rating agencies to detail the type and extent of diligence that
the rating agency would commit to undertake (or to impose on issuers
as a condition for ratings). In this way rating agencies’ commitments
would form a backdrop for understanding the scope of rating
agencies’ certification and mandatory reporting duties and the
potential basis for actions by creditors or the SEC, topics which the
following Section will discuss.224 Additionally, the SEC could be
given discretion to reject low bids that fail to meet the agency’s
minimal thresholds of diligence requirements or to condition bids on
satisfying such thresholds. Rating agencies’ self-interest as repeat
players would create significant incentives to be responsive to the
SEC and creditors’ concerns raised both during and after the bidding
process.
The virtue of either approach is that implementing a bidding
process to secure ratings would allow the SEC to open up
participation to a far broader pool of rating agencies and potentially
level the playing field for new entrants.225 Smaller rating firms that
could not hope to compete with Moody’s or S&P in offering ratings
for every conceivable issue could leverage expertise in the risks
involved in particular sectors of the economy to compete in terms of

224. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
225. This approach would not rely on speculative hopes of the creation of new rating
agencies. There are approximately sixty-four rating agencies worldwide, and all the SEC
would need to do to create more competition is to convince experienced overseas rating
agencies to participate in a more open U.S. market. See Credit Rating Agencies–Globally,
http://www.defaultrisk.com/rating_agencies.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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both price and quality.226 While issuers currently may be afraid of
defecting from Moody’s for fear of retribution in the form of
unsolicited, negative ratings,227 the SEC could open up the markets
for ratings. This approach would seek to have a user fee system
largely pay for itself both in terms of diminished costs and higher
value in terms of greater accuracy of ratings.
3. The Creditor Committee Complement to a User Fee System
The SEC’s role in administering a user fee system is only part of
the appeal of a user fee model as it would also create an ongoing
relationship between creditors and rating agencies. The SEC would
play an indispensable role in the process of securing the services of
rating agencies in the period prior to creditors’ purchase of the debt
at issue. But following creditors’ purchase of debt, creditors would be
in a position to monitor rating agencies and complement SEC
oversight.
Corporate law has rarely considered the potential for joint efforts
by creditors outside of the bankruptcy context.228 Under the current
system creditors’ rights are solely defined by their contractual
relationships with issuers. Creditors are treated as essentially
atomistic in nature with no concept of horizontal privity among
creditors based on their relationship with a given issuer.229 Since
creditors have a variety of potentially conflicting interests in the
direction of a corporation, academics have generally assumed it is
impractical to empower creditors to intervene in any context save the
reorganization or liquidation of an issuer.230

226. See Morgenson, supra note 206 (discussing Egan-Jones’ use of a similar market
niche strategy under the current system).
227. See infra Part II.D.4.
228. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate
Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1350–59 (2007) (discussing the challenges of
extending corporate duties to creditors outside of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process).
229. See, e.g., Jo Ann J. Brighton & Mark N. Berman, Second-Lien Financings:
Enforcement of Intercreditor Agreements in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2006,
at 38–39 (discussing how intercreditor agreements generally consist of alliances of lenders
or homogeneous subsets of creditors, rather than creditors as a whole); C. Edward Dobbs,
Negotiating Points in Second Lien Financing Transactions, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
189, 190–93 (2006) (discussing the challenges facing efforts to negotiate intercreditor
agreements).
230. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 860–64 (1996) (discussing the conflicts
of interest which may arise among creditors as issuers approach insolvency); see also
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1237–38 (2005) (providing empirical data

2009]

RATING AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY

1067

A user fee system creates the potential for challenging the
conventional wisdom by crafting new relationships among creditors
vis-à-vis the rating agencies. The creation of creditor committees
would serve as a complement to a user fee system by providing a
channel for creditors to monitor ratings and to assert limited rights
against rating agencies. This approach would build on the model of
creditor committees that are used in bankruptcy contexts to represent
the interests of creditors.231
One challenge of assembling a creditor committee in a
bankruptcy context is balancing the representation of different
categories of creditors with potentially divergent interests.232 One of
the many reasons that creditors generally have no rights (outside of
contractual rights) in the management of a corporation is that the
varying level of protection they enjoy may lead to divergent
incentives for how they may seek to influence corporate policies.233
The more similar the debtholder’s interests are to an equityholder, for
example, a preferred stockholder, the more they may support equity
maximizing strategies, and the weaker the protection the more
debtholders may want to push for risk-averse investment decisions.234
Similar problems may present themselves in the rating agency context
as different categories of creditors may be impacted more severely by
rating downgrades from investment-grade to non-investment-grade or
a default event.
Creditor committees in the bankruptcy context seek to address
the challenges of potentially conflicting interests by having
representation of each class of creditor and requiring their consent to
court-approved reorganizations.235 Building off of the creditor
from the bankruptcy context which supports the concern about conflicts of interests
among creditors).
231. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1122.01 (rev. 15th ed. 2007) (discussing the
centrality of creditor committees and committees representing other stakeholders in the
bankruptcy reorganization process).
232. See Henry T.C. Hu, Buffett, Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of Sheep, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 392–95 (1997) (discussing how conflicts within different categories
of stakeholders may shape their priorities in corporate risk taking).
233. See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 228, at 1353–54, 1361–63 (discussing how
divergent interests among creditors may cause them to push for different corporate
strategies if they enjoy a measure of control over the issuer).
234. See Hu, supra note 232, at 392–95.
235. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(2)(i) (2006) (“The United States trustee shall appoint a
committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees
of creditors or of equity security holders.”); see also § 1109(b) (noting that in a bankruptcy
proceeding “a party in interest . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in
a case under this chapter”); Hu & Westbrook, supra note 228, at 1370 (discussing
governance issues in bankruptcy).
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committee concept in the rating agency context would be simpler
than in the bankruptcy context. Regardless of the divergent
economic interests among creditors, creditors all benefit from clear
and accurate gauges of risk and timely warnings of potential defaults.
Each creditor is impacted by rating agencies’ fidelity to their duties,
and therefore considerations of representation (and the weighing of
representation) of different categories of creditors would likely be far
less important.
The simplest way to construct a creditor committee would be to
have it consist of representatives of the initial purchasers of debt who
would reflect a cross-section of the classes of creditors with holdings
above a set threshold. The composition of the creditor committee
would change as subsequent resales of debt took place, and the
committee’s composition would be limited to current debtholders.
Bankruptcy law provides a template for the selection process for
creditor committees as creditors of each class of debt could nominate
a class representative by “voting” their pro rata share of the debt.236
Nominations would all be subject to SEC approval, which would only
be withheld in extraordinary circumstances.
The word “committee” may conjure up an image of a
cumbersome new layer of bureaucracy. But the objective of creating
creditor committees is the opposite: to complement the need for
ongoing oversight of rating agencies by the SEC with a mechanism for
coordinating creditor monitoring of rating agencies. The creditor
committee would serve as a channel for creditors to pool resources in
monitoring and holding rating agencies accountable. In the event that
rating agencies breach duties owed to the creditors, creditor
committees would serve as the representative for creditors in any
potential actions against rating agencies and would preempt actions
brought by individual creditors.
The use of a creditor committee would also serve as a safeguard
against potential capture of regulatory oversight by the SEC (or a
subsidiary body).237 One challenge facing regulated industries is the
ingenuity of regulated parties to manipulate the political process to
influence regulators.238 Placing a creditors’ committee in a position of

236. See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 228, at 1370–72.
237. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 27 (voicing concern that regulation of rating
agencies could lead to political capture).
238. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–85 (2006) (discussing public choice theory and risks
of political capture of regulated industries).

2009]

RATING AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY

1069

oversight would mitigate this risk by making accountability rest in
part with beneficiaries rather than solely with political appointees.239
IV. CRAFTING RATING AGENCY DUTIES
A. Redefining Accountability for Rating Agencies
1. The Challenges of Delineating Rating Agency Duties
A user fee system would create opportunities for accountability
by forging ongoing relationships between rating agencies, the SEC,
and creditors, yet the efficacy of accountability will largely turn on
balancing incentives for the SEC and creditors to monitor rating
agencies with manageable gatekeeper duties and liability exposure.
This Section delineates certification and mandatory reporting duties
for rating agencies modeled after duties facing auditors, which would
expand and formalize the role of rating agencies as screeners of issuer
disclosures and as the backstop for auditor and lawyer gatekeeping
duties. It suggests how limiting financial liability to creditors to cases
of gross negligence, coupled with an earnings-based cap on liability
and other safeguards, will constitute a manageable burden for rating
agencies, while still creating incentives for creditor monitoring.
Lastly, this Section suggests how vesting enforcement discretion in
the SEC for negligent conduct would help to ensure that liability
exposure to creditors would not skew rating agencies’ incentives too
far in favor of creditors.
Policymakers could make rating agency duties to creditors a
contractual condition of rating agency funding or a regulatory
condition for NRSRO eligibility. The SEC could require all contracts
with rating agencies under the user fee system to detail duties that
rating agencies owe to their creditors, to delineate the potential
liability exposure for breach of these duties, and to channel
adjudication of any disputes over alleged breaches to an SEC
administrative process.240 Alternatively, the SEC could exercise its
239. See Stephenson, supra note 44, at 110–11 (discussing how private enforcers may
overcome enforcement slack by public agencies, due to political pressure, enforcers’ sloth
or inaction, or lobbying).
240. Although the SEC does not currently adjudicate claims through an administrative
process, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has extensive experience
in adjudicating claims. For example, the CFTC provides opportunities for customers of
commodities brokers with opportunities to seek damages against brokers for violations of
the Commodity Exchange Act or other CFTC regulations, as well as adjudicates
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction(s) or occurrence(s). See Commodity
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regulatory authority in granting NRSRO status to make acceptance of
rating agency duties to creditors a requirement for rating agencies’
continued NRSRO status. Currently, there are no strings attached to
NRSRO status, but there is no reason that the conferral of the
privilege or “property right” that NRSRO status entails could not be
linked with the acceptance of duties.241
In crafting gatekeeping duties, reformers must confront two
types of problems: the need to delineate rating agency duties that
balance credible commitments to impose liability on wayward rating
agencies with manageable burdens and the need for incentives for
monitoring by creditors. The crux of the first problem is that there
are inherent ambiguities in the rating process. Just as the nature of
auditing and legal functions makes it difficult to delineate the lines
between good lawyering or auditing and facilitation of corporate
wrongdoing,242 the nature of assessing risk exposure means that it is
difficult to scrutinize rating agencies’ decisions. One needs only
glance at the alphabet soup of formal letter ratings and the different
methodologies used by rating agencies to understand that the “bucket

Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836–37, 856–57 (1986) (upholding the
CFTC’s jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims raised in its adjudicative process, so long
as the counterclaims are “necessary to make the reparations procedure workable” for the
underlying federal claim).
241. To the extent that a reader is not persuaded by the merits of a user fee approach,
it is worth noting that this linkage of “the bitter with the sweet” in granting rating agencies
NRSRO status could also serve as an independent basis for this Article’s focus on shifting
accountability from issuers to creditors.
242. The gatekeeper responsibilities introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act spurred
extensive debate about the potential and pitfalls of auditor and lawyer gatekeeper duties.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 336–37 (arguing that the gatekeeping duties created by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not adequately address the incentives that accounting
gatekeepers have to acquiesce to irregularities); Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen &
Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 725, 789–98 (2004) (highlighting the shortcomings of the gatekeeping duties for
lawyers); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1052–54 (2005) (criticizing the disclosure rules for
lawyers as not going far enough and proposing ways to make disclosures more effective by
enhancing the independence of corporate counsel); Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial
Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, 31 J. CORP. L. 1097, 1100–12 (2006)
(arguing that proactive lawyer monitoring would produce only marginal benefits for fraud,
mistake, and interpretation, and have no impact on GAAP errors causing the
informational failure); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in
Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2005) [hereinafter Schwarcz, The Limits of
Lawyering] (arguing for a limited gatekeeper duty that so long as lawyers neither know
nor should know that their opinions will be used to facilitate accounting fraud they may
deliver legal opinions).
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system” of rating risk by categories obfuscates the rating process and
the degree of accuracy of individual ratings.243
This Section will suggest that the best way to resolve these
challenges is to have certification and mandatory reporting
requirements, which are subject to a negligence standard, serve as the
centerpiece for rating agency gatekeeper duties. However, while
rating agencies could be subject to informal action by the SEC for
negligent conduct, this proposal would limit financial liability
exposure to creditors to cases of gross negligence in order to mitigate
risks of over-deterrence.
2. The Scope of a Certification Requirement
Certification and mandatory reporting duties for auditors under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act form a template for constructing a workable
system of gatekeeping duties and liability for rating agencies.244
Although these duties would assume a different form in the context of
rating agencies, rating agencies could be required to certify on a
quarterly basis that they have exercised reasonable care in conducting
due diligence of issuers’ financial and nonfinancial disclosures to
make accurate assessments of risk exposure.245 Similarly, rating
agencies could be required not only to flag incipient signs of fraud for
their creditor clients to gauge risk exposure, but also to notify both
creditors and the SEC when rating agency requests for issuers to
provide additional information are stymied with nonresponses.246
The underlying appeal for imposing a certification duty is that it
would formalize the status of rating agencies as the sole gatekeeper
that scrutinizes both financial and nonfinancial disclosures.247 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act effectively created a system in which gatekeeping
duties apply to looking at each half of the elephant, yet no gatekeeper
is accountable for assessing the whole. Auditors must certify the
243. See Hill, supra note 15, at 47–49.
244. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 337–40.
245. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a)–(e) (2006). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also introduced a
similar certification requirement for the chief executive and financial officers of public
companies who must vouch that each disclosure report fairly presents the financial
conditions and results of the company in all material respects. See 18 U.S.C. § 1350(b)
(2006).
246. While not the focus of this Article, a parallel reform would be to bar rating
agencies from offering consulting services to issuers. This approach would mirror the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s prohibition of auditors from hawking ancillary consulting services to
their clients because of concerns about auditor independence. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g).
247. Cf. Sale, supra note 1, at 411–20 (discussing the potential and limits of enlisting
investment banks as screeners of corporate wrongdoing).
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financial disclosures of issuers, and Sarbanes-Oxley took the first step
toward having lawyers certify diligent review of the nonfinancial
disclosures.248 But nothing stops issuers from continuing to subvert
these gatekeepers by farming out work to auditors and lawyers in a
way that ensures that no one has a big picture view of what is
happening.249
Rating agencies are uniquely positioned to assume responsibility
for a more global view of issuers. In theory, they already perform this
role in assessing risks, yet the lack of liability, regardless of the degree
of thoroughness or accuracy (or lack thereof), makes it a hollow
obligation.250 Imposing a certification duty on rating agencies backed
by the threat of liability may create incentives for rating agencies to
scrutinize issuer disclosures more closely for fraud risks and
creditworthiness. A certification obligation would not be tantamount
to requiring rating agencies to pour through every disclosure from a
given issuer.251 However, they would have incentives to develop more
transparent processes for analyzing issuer disclosures and assessing
credit worthiness. A certification obligation would also encourage
rating agencies to articulate clearer reasons for their ultimate
decisions on risk exposure. In the long run, this approach would not
only enhance the value of corporate disclosures to investors, but also
would strengthen the significance of ratings themselves as a proxy for
issuer risk exposure.
However desirable a certification duty may appear, defining the
contours of that duty may be more difficult for rating agencies than
for auditors. The analogy between the certification roles of an
auditor and rating agency is admittedly an imperfect one because of
the different functions they perform. The greater precision of
accounting rules means that auditors may be capable of achieving a
far greater degree of certainty in examining financial data than rating
agencies can achieve in assessing the risk exposure of issuers.252 As a

248. See Cunningham, supra note 57, at 949–54, 966–68.
249. See POWERS et al., supra note 100, at 3–10 (discussing the piecemeal way in which
Enron doled out its legal work to prevent securities intermediaries from appreciating the
deception that was afoot).
250. See supra Part II.D.
251. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 354–57 (discussing the nature of auditor certification
roles and the potential nature of lawyer certification roles).
252. See Cunningham, supra note 57, at 949–54 (discussing the responsibilities and
challenges which auditors face).
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result, auditors can make an affirmative certification that financial
disclosures conform with GAAP.253
In contrast, rating agencies assume a much broader responsibility
and are likely not as privy to the internal goings on of issuers as are
issuers’ lawyers and accountants.254 That being said, rating agencies
do enjoy leverage to demand additional nonpublic information from
issuers in order to grant or maintain a rating.255 This fact means that
rating agencies’ certification duty should be commensurate with their
ability to acquire additional information and the need for rating
agencies to exercise due care in deciding whether or not to press
issuers for additional information.
Given the balance of challenges that rating agencies may face, a
modified negative assurance approach is appealing. In short, a
negative assurance approach would require rating agencies to certify
that their conclusions are based on diligence of the disclosures and
risk factors that are reasonably available.256 Rating agencies could
satisfy this negative assurance certification duty by attesting that they
engaged in reasonable care in reviewing the issuer’s disclosures and
requesting additional information that is sufficient to support their
conclusions about risk exposure and the absence of signs of fraud.257
Additionally, they would have to attest that they have no knowledge
or belief that other material information relevant to the disclosures
has been withheld by the issuer or excluded from the rating agencies’
analysis.258 This certification would constitute both a formalization
and an expansion of the role of ratings agencies and provide a legal
backdrop for efforts to hold rating agencies accountable.

253. See AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 110.01 (2003).

CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS

254. Given these limits, policymakers may not want rating agencies to face as onerous
a set of certification requirements as accountants. A similar concern would apply in
considering the scope of a formal certification requirement for lawyers because their
ability to make a certification is also more narrow than auditors. Lawyers’ diligence
efforts largely focus on the legality and internal consistency of the types of documents
their clients present for review.
255. See Kraakman, supra note 7, at 61–66.
256. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 356–57 (pointing out the potential virtues of negative
assurance certifications in the lawyer context).
257. Framing the duty in terms of reasonable care would be designed to focus rating
agencies on creating reliable benchmarks of risk. As the following section will discuss,
rating agencies’ financial liability to creditors would be limited to cases of gross negligence
to avoid risks of over-deterrence, while the SEC would have leeway to impose
nonfinancial sanctions in cases of ordinary negligence.
258. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 356–57.
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3. The Extent of Mandatory Reporting Requirements
Mandatory reporting requirements for rating agencies could also
be constructed to parallel the mandatory reporting requirement for
auditors.259 Auditors must investigate and disclose potential signs of
fraud to the management and audit committee if they are merely
aware of evidence that an “illegal act . . . has or may have occurred,”
even if it is not perceived to be material.260 If the auditor concludes
the illegal act has a material effect and believes that appropriate
remedial action has not been taken, the auditor must file a formal
report about the illegal act both with the client’s board of directors
and the SEC.261
Both the mandatory nature of and triggers for disclosures of
evidence of fraud are relevant for constructing similar duties for
rating agencies. Under the current system a rating agency could
always use perceived evidence of illicit activity or fraud as a basis to
downgrade the rating of an issuer. After all, signs of fraud may
reasonably be perceived to be the tip of the iceberg of corporate
cultures gone awry, a tale the Enron saga captured. But shifting to a
mandatory disclosure system would formalize a rating agency’s duty
to disclose this information when incipient signs of illicit activity
arise.262 This duty would seek to ensure that another set of eyes watch
the issuer, which may be particularly important when auditors and
lawyers are either expressly or tacitly complicit with their clients’
wrongdoing.
Requirements for timely disclosure of signs of wrongdoing could
be far simpler under a user fee approach. Since creditors would be
the clients of rating agencies, it flows logically that rating agencies
have a duty to disclose immediately any evidence that an illegal act
has or may have occurred, regardless of its materiality. This swift
259. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006).
260. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a)–(b). In contrast, lawyers must only report potential
violations to their client’s officers or board of directors if the lawyers encounter credible
evidence of material violations, a much higher standard which may justify inaction. See 17
C.F.R. § 205.3 (2008).
261. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(b)(2)–(3). In contrast, SEC guidelines for lawyers allow for
permissive, rather than obligatory, disclosure of evidence of material violations under
certain circumstances. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(ii). In other words, the rules allow lawyers
to blow the whistle, but in practice lawyers would have strong incentives not to risk their
relationship with their client and instead to wash their hands of the matter after notifying
the client of the problem.
262. Although some commentators have argued that rating agencies cannot practically
screen for signs of fraud, see, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 6, rating agencies implicitly
have an obligation to disclose evidence of fraud that they are aware of since it would
constitute a significant credit risk.
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disclosure of even non-material information to creditors would be
relevant for investment decisions and therefore should be made
available at the time it is known in order to minimize risks of insider
trading. To the extent that a rating agency determines material
effects may flow from signs of fraud, the rating agency should be
obliged to make immediate, detailed disclosures to the SEC and
creditors in order to expedite enforcement action and to mitigate
potential losses.
Some may object that a mandatory reporting requirement could
compromise the willingness of issuers to make nonpublic disclosures
available to rating agencies and therefore thwart the gatekeeping
role. But it is not clear that mandatory disclosure requirements
would significantly change the incentives of issuers to disclose
information to rating agencies. Rating agencies would continue to
enjoy leverage over issuers because of their ability to withhold or
downgrade ratings. Permissive reporting of signs of fraud has always
been an option for rating agencies.263 Lawyers are far more restricted
in making disclosures to the SEC because of the nature of the
attorney-client relationship, but even they have always had permissive
disclosure exceptions in contexts such as preventing present or future
criminal fraud.264
Both lawyers and their clients enter into
relationships appreciating the fact that their confidentiality may be
compromised if exceptional third-party or judicial interests are at
stake,265 and there is little empirical evidence that suggests that
disclosure rules have compromised information flows between issuers
and lawyers.266 The experience of lawyers suggests that there is little
to fear as the incentives for cooperation would likely remain strong in
the rating agency context.
Additionally, shifting from permissive to mandatory disclosure
rules may actually strengthen the ability of rating agencies to press for
further information. The threat of liability hanging over the heads of

263. Similarly, permissive reporting to the SEC is supported by both ABA rules and
state ethics laws in the overwhelming majority of states. See THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2003 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, ATTORNEYS’ LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOCIETY, ETHICS RULE ON
CLIENT CONFIDENCES 161–68 (2003) (providing an overview of state ethics rules on
disclosure of client’s confidential information and noting that a minority of states even
require disclosure of confidential information to prevent a client’s fraud and permit
lawyers to disclose confidential information to address past fraud by clients).
264. See id.
265. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 376–79
(1989).
266. See Cramton et al., supra note 242, at 789–98, 814–16.
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both the issuer and rating agencies may provide a more compelling
reason for rating agencies proactively to request additional materials
and for issuers to provide additional information than under the
incentive structure of the current system.267
B.

Oversight Under a Gross Negligence Approach Tempered by
Caps and Safeguards
1. The Appeal of Limiting Liability to Gross Negligence

The combination of certification and mandatory reporting
requirements would provide rating agencies with more clear
responsibilities in overseeing issuer disclosures. Limiting rating
agencies’ financial liability to cases of gross negligence, coupled with
an earnings-based cap on liability and other safeguards, would
provide rating agencies with incentives for compliance without
jeopardizing their financial viability. The SEC could complement this
approach by having enforcement discretion to impose nonfinancial
sanctions in cases of negligent conduct.268
A gross negligence approach would impose liability for rating
agencies’ failures to identify or engage in diligence of risks of such a
nature and degree that the failure constitutes a gross deviation from a
reasonable person’s standard of care.269 This approach would
267. See id. at 816.
268. One alternative to imposing sanctions for negligence and gross negligence would
be to treat ratings as expert opinions that would be primarily subject to Rule 10b-5 and
section 11 liability. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). The virtue
of the expert opinion approach is that it would piggyback off of existing liability schemes
that courts have considerable experience in applying. The problem is that Rule 10b-5
would likely be too under-inclusive in covering only fraudulent conduct (and requiring
causation and scienter), while the heart of the problem with rating agencies appears to be
a matter of negligence or gross negligence in failing to reasonably scrutinize risks and to
demand additional information. In contrast, section 11 liability would likely overdeter in
imposing near strict liability for material misstatements or omissions, which could prove to
be such an exacting standard that it may drive rating agencies out of the business or
dramatically raise the costs of rating agencies’ services to cover the higher liability
exposure.
269. There are numerous definitions of gross negligence, which appear to coalesce
around the concept of the absence of the failure to exercise even slight care or diligence.
For example, Delaware courts apply a standard of gross negligence to determine whether
corporate directors have sufficiently informed themselves to receive deference under the
business judgment rule, and they define gross negligence as “ ‘reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of [the interests of] the whole body of stockholders or actions which
are ‘without the bounds of reason.’ ” Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., [1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,327, at 96,585 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (quoting
Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316
A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974)); see also
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admittedly impose greater costs on rating agencies, yet be designed
not to constitute an unreasonable financial burden. The existence of
this potential liability would heighten the already substantial leverage
that rating agencies have to demand additional information before
agreeing to certify ratings, and provide both rating agencies and
issuers with incentives to spend more time examining disclosures
more thoroughly. This approach may partly pay for itself due to the
deterrent value against issuers and rating agencies, the heightened
probability that rating agencies will flag misleading disclosures at an
earlier point, and the greater reliability of both ratings and issuer
disclosures to the public.
The dilemma that public enforcers face is that rating agencies
have specialized skills and somewhat opaque methods that may allow
them to obfuscate the degree of issuer risk exposure, which makes it
very difficult to delineate a clear standard of conduct.270 While active
complicity with issuers is possible, the nature of ratings would make it
hard to identify intentional wrongdoing except in the very rare cases
of a “smoking gun” e-mail. In reality, suspect rating agency activity
will likely fall within a spectrum of negligent, grossly negligent,
reckless, or severely reckless conduct.
The temptation is to seek to impose strict liability in order to
provide the SEC or beneficiaries with a powerful weapon for cutting
through the haze of rating agency lingo that may be designed to
obscure the degree of compliance.271 The strict liability approach
would shift the burden of determining optimal compliance levels into
the laps of rating agencies,272 and would save courts and public

Saunders v. Sullivan, No. 3731991, 1992 WL 53423, at *2 (Del. Feb. 26, 1992) (“Gross
negligence is the failure to perceive a risk of such a nature and degree that the failure to
perceive such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care exercised by a
reasonable person.”). Black’s Law Dictionary defines gross negligence as “a manifestly
smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a
person of ordinary prudence” that “falls short of being such reckless disregard of probable
consequences as is equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1033 (6th ed. 1990).
270. See Black, supra note 41, at 790.
271. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 350–53 (advocating that auditors face modified strict
liability for corporate disclosures with a cap on liability based on a multiple of their
expected revenue streams from a given client); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the
Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491,
540–46 (2001) (advocating the imposition of strict liability on all gatekeepers, including
investment banks, accountants, and lawyers, for material misstatements and omissions in
offering documents).
272. It is important to note that strict liability would only theoretically force
gatekeepers to internalize the cost of their misconduct. Even an optimal standard and
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enforcers the costly and difficult tasks of ferreting out subtle
distinctions between good-faith compliance and subversive
obfuscation by rating agencies.273 Strict liability, however, may
overdeter by punishing good-faith efforts to comply even in cases
where there was no way (or at least no reasonably cost-effective way)
that rating agencies could have identified wrongdoing.274
This problem is compounded by the fact that there are intrinsic
limits in the ability of rating agencies to assess risk exposure and signs
of issuer fraud. However much policymakers might want rating
agencies to internalize the costs of failure, there are disclosures that
may be so deceptive that even the issuer’s auditors and lawyers could
not recognize them.275 Applying strict liability in these cases would
result in a deadweight loss on society, and worse still could threaten
to undermine the financial viability of rating agencies for no
enforcement gain.276
The other extreme would be to make the trigger for liability be
recklessness or severe recklessness, which is the standard applied to
establishing auditor fraud. For example, establishing auditor scienter
for fraud under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”) requires a showing of “severe recklessness,” which is
“not merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care.”277 In the auditor
context “[t]he [plaintiff] must prove that the accounting practices
were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at all, or an
egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful.”278

sanction would bear little fruit if the probability of enforcement were low. See Coffee,
supra note 7, at 322–23.
273. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–17 (1987)
(providing a comprehensive overview of the merits of strict liability versus negligence
liability).
274. But see Partnoy, supra note 271, at 510–16 (discussing the costs that imposing
negligence liability on gatekeepers may inflict).
275. See Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin & Linda Hamilton, At the Interface of Law and
Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor
Liability to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 215–17
(2000) (discussing the gap that exists between the aspirations of public policymakers for
auditing and auditors’ actual ability to screen for securities fraud).
276. See Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and
GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 41–42 (2002).
277. Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added) (quoting Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 1999)).
278. PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 2004 FED App. 0318P, ¶ 34, 364 F.3d 671, 693
(6th Cir.) (emphasis added); see also In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407,
1426 (9th Cir. 1994) (making the same point).
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Policymakers may understandably want to set an extremely high
bar for proving auditor fraud,279 but applying a recklessness or severe
recklessness standard to rating agencies may have little deterrence
value because it would very rarely apply. Instead, the focus of rating
agency accountability is on their diligence in assessing risks, which is
why negligence or gross negligence seems a more appropriate
standard. But while adoption of negligence-based liability could open
the floodgates to litigation about the contours of reasonable care in
the ratings context, the lighter touch of applying a gross negligence
approach may offer a better balance of incentives for gatekeeper
compliance and monitoring by creditors. There remains a danger that
rating agencies may still be overly cautious if they face significant
uncertainty concerning what constitutes compliance.280 A degree of
overdeterrence may be unavoidable because of the risk of error by
both the rating agencies and adjudicators in interpreting the scope of
duties.
Rating agencies may respond to both these uncertainties and
higher risk exposures on the margins by exiting or selectively
reducing their exposure to markets. However, rating agencies would
only have to show slight care or diligence in identifying and assessing
risks to avoid liability for gross negligence, which is a modest standard
to satisfy.281 There may be legitimate concerns that a shift to liability
for gross negligence would drive up the fees that rating agencies
would charge for their services. Rating agencies would have both the
interest and the leverage to demand additional disclosures from
issuers and to invest more resources in fulfilling their diligence
requirements. They would also demand higher fees to offset these
costs and the greater risk of litigation.
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the creation of a user fee
system could at least partly offset these pressures by centralizing
demand for ratings in a single clearinghouse and driving down the

279. Part of the reason for setting a high bar on auditor fraud is because a basic
premise of financial reporting is that the company—not the auditor—is responsible for the
company’s financial statements. AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note
253, § 110.03. The auditor’s role is to opine on whether the financial statements fairly
present, in all material respects, the company’s financial position and accord with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. See id. § 110.01.
280. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37
J.L. & ECON. 1, 10–14 (1994) (discussing how varying interpretations by courts concerning
what constitutes good-faith compliance may lead to excessive caution by potential
defendants).
281. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 862–63 (1994).
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leverage that rating agencies would enjoy over their creditor clients.
Increased compliance costs and demands for information would likely
produce complaints from issuers, but would not radically change the
economics for these services.282
One paradox of applying liability for gross negligence is that it
may accentuate the incentives of rating agencies to equivocate to
preserve defenses of reasonableness and therefore dampen the value
of their services. For example, third-party opinions offered by
lawyers are already notorious for being known more for their
numerous caveats and thickness than for their substance.283 Rating
agencies could similarly be expected to use equivocation as a shield to
respond to greater threats of liability.
2. Capping Liability Exposure as a Multiple of Rating Agency Fees
A significant concern with certification and reporting
requirements is that they may expose rating agencies to potentially
ruinous liability, even in the case of a single breach.284 One way to
mitigate this risk is to cap the liability exposure of rating agencies to a
multiple of their annual fees and to require rating agencies to carry
insurance or to meet self-insurance requirements to guard against this
risk.285 A user fee system could easily impose these requirements by
integrating them into the contractual relationships among the SEC,
creditors, and the rating agencies, or alternatively this approach could
serve as a regulatory condition for conferral of NRSRO status.
Since rating agencies only receive a small percentage of the value
of bond issues as compensation, the threat of capped damages at a
multiple of annual fees would still have significant deterrent effects.
This approach would seek to balance the desire to heighten incentives
for rating agency compliance with the need to avoid exposing rating
agencies to “nuclear” liability that could bankrupt the rating

282. See Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of
Corporate-Governance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at A1.
283. See Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawerying, supra note 242, at 6–8.
284. A number of leading academics have made the case for a modified strict liability
standard on auditors because of their essential role in safeguarding the financial stability
of corporations in spite of these risks. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 350–52; Partnoy,
supra note 271, at 540–46.
285. Professor Ronen introduced an analogue of this idea by calling for issuers to
purchase insurance for their financial statements, and Professor Coffee has refined this
concept by calling for auditors to take out insurance that is a multiple of their revenue
stream. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 350–52; Ronen, supra note 276, at 41–42.
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agencies.286 Exposing rating agencies to unlimited liability as a joint
tortfeasor with corporate issuers such as Enron or Bear Stearns could
impose a burden that rating agencies simply could not bear and may
make rating agencies exit significant segments of the ratings
industry.287 In contrast, adopting liability caps of double the annual
fees from their coverage of a given issuer or debt issue would serve
deterrence purposes in a more measured way. A system of caps on
liability exposure could also allow for the imposition of a higher
multiple of annual fees in the case of repeated or willful breaches of
duty, creating a bounded punitive damage exception that would be
consistent with a deterrence strategy.288
Caps on liability exposure would also facilitate the ability of
rating agencies to secure insurance coverage for their potential
liability. Given that rating agencies appear effectively immune from
liability risks under the current system, this mandate would provide
incentives for the creation of a new insurance market. While this
approach may constitute a significant departure from past practices,
insurance markets (and their derivative analogues) cover an ever
increasing set of risks, and the cap approach would make rating
agency exposure a more measurable risk that could be insured.289 In
the alternative, rating agencies could bypass the need for formal
insurance if their capital levels and diversification of risks are high
enough that they are effectively self-insured.290
Requiring minimum insurance levels would impose a financial
burden on rating agencies, who would in turn seek to pass it on to
286. See Macey, supra note 174, at 342 (discussing how applying “nuclear” liability can
warp the incentives for securities intermediaries).
287. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 306 (discussing how gatekeepers simply lack the
financial ability to provide significant compensation to investors through victim suits).
288. An alternative to a system of capped damages would be to embrace a citizen suit
model and to grant prevailing private litigants attorneys’ fees and expenses. See Greve,
supra note 46, at 356. In the citizen suit context, the expected value of suit is always
negative because at most the plaintiff can cover its expenses, which means that there is a
built in disincentive against abuse of the legal process. The potential shortcoming of
applying a citizen suit approach in the rating agency context is that rating agencies could
be exposed to significantly higher liability which could raise concerns of overdeterrence.
Nonetheless, should this Article’s proposal for capped damages for gross negligence fail to
attract many plaintiffs, a citizen suit approach would be worth consideration as a means of
incentivizing greater private oversight of rating agencies.
289. See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509,
2516–20 (2003) (documenting the emergence of private terrorism insurance and other
catastrophic loss insurance in spite of far greater uncertainties of liability exposure).
290. See Rory A. Goode, Self-Insurance as Insurance in Liability Policy “Other
Insurance” Provisions, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1245, 1250–55 (1999) (discussing selfinsurance as a substitute for commercial policies).
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their creditor clients. While this approach would entail significant
economic costs, it would provide a transparent set of financial
incentives for rating agency compliance, yet mitigate the risks that
liability exposure would cause them to exit or limit their market
exposure.
3. The Enforcement Roles of Creditor Committees and the SEC
One potential pitfall of a gross negligence standard is that it may
prove to be an invitation for private suits which seek to exploit the
indeterminacies of gross negligence for its settlement value. For this
reason, it may make sense to have creditor committees weed out
frivolous suits and to have litigation of claims fall within the exclusive
purview of an SEC adjudicative process.
Creditor committees would serve as a mediating structure to
represent the interests of creditors in SEC actions. They would
centralize rating agency monitoring efforts, coordinate litigation
strategy for SEC adjudications of their claims, and provide a
framework for determining the degree of compensation for each
creditor class. Creditor committees would not only serve to overcome
collective action problems but also to stymie opportunistic
unilateralism.291 Any individual creditor could provide information
on gatekeeper noncompliance directly to the SEC, but requiring that
potential actions against rating agencies receive the support of
creditors committees would serve as a screening mechanism for
frivolous or nuisance suits against rating agencies.
Requiring that all suits be brought within an SEC adjudicative
process may provide the SEC with more leeway to use a range of
financial and reputational sanctions to secure compliance with
gatekeeper duties. This approach is particularly relevant under a
system of liability for gross negligence as there may be many cases
where the action or inaction of rating agencies may merit informal
sanctions and responses, yet the evidence would not constitute gross
negligence.292

291. See infra Part III.B.2.
292. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (significantly curtailing the ability of
private plaintiffs to use class action litigation in securities suits through means such as
creating a heightened pleading standard for establishing securities fraud and abolishing
state court class actions for securities fraud); see also Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.) (limiting the ability of private plaintiffs to bring class action securities suits in
state courts by creating national standards).
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While the SEC should allow financial sanctions when the gross
negligence of rating agencies inflicts harm on creditors, the SEC
should have the disciplinary powers to heighten deterrence even in
cases where evidence of negligence comes to light which has not
harmed creditors. Pursuing a “broken windows” strategy of imposing
nonfinancial disciplinary sanctions in cases when lesser breaches
come to light may allow the SEC to leverage reputational concerns to
heighten incentives for compliance.293 For example, the SEC can
already impose disciplinary measures of barring or censuring auditors
if they engage in “[a] single instance of highly unreasonable conduct”
or “[r]epeated instances of unreasonable conduct” which breach
professional standards.294 The ability to impose disciplinary sanctions
is inherent in the SEC’s ability to restrict access to securities
markets,295 but expressly vesting disciplinary power in the SEC to
impose nonfinancial sanctions on negligent rating agencies, such as
limits on the ability to participate in future bids for ratings, would
complement efforts to deter through liability exposure to creditors for
gross negligence.296
An additional virtue of equipping the SEC, rather than creditors,
with discretion to pursue informal sanctions in cases of negligence is
that it would place closer calls for enforcement in the hands of public
regulators.
Policymakers may be concerned that empowering
creditors to sue rating agencies may supplant current incentives for
marginally high ratings that favor issuers with a system in which rating
agencies face incentives for marginally low ratings that favor
creditors. While imposing rating agency liability to creditors in cases
of gross negligence is designed to reduce incentives for unjustifiably
high ratings, vesting enforcement discretion in the SEC in cases of
negligence seeks to temper countervailing incentives for low ratings
by making accountability in these closer cases rest with public actors

293. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171–82 (1996)
(discussing the “broken windows” strategy of focusing on small offenses for their broad
deterrence value). See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows,
ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29 (laying out the “broken windows” thesis as a deterrence
strategy).
294. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(iv) (2008).
295. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 359–60.
296. See Jim Frederick, Japan’s Regulators Get Tough, TIME, May 15, 2006,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1194088,00.html (discussing how the
Japanese government suspended an affiliate of PricewaterhouseCoopers from performing
auditing services for two months as a penalty for its role in accounting fraud).
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who do not possess the self-interest to push for systematically high or
low ratings.
This approach would not preclude creditors committees or
individual debt purchasers from requesting the SEC to investigate
conduct by rating agencies that merely constitutes negligence. The
underlying idea would be that policymakers would want creditors to
provide streams of information on rating agency noncompliance.
However, they would seek to mitigate the costs of formal
administrative proceedings initiated by creditors by limiting these
actions to contexts where the case is already well developed and more
easily proven.
Policymakers may also be concerned that the possibility that the
SEC could resort to nonfinancial sanctions to discipline wayward
rating agencies could dampen creditors’ incentives to invest in
monitoring rating agencies. While it is true that creditors would
ideally want to be made whole from grossly negligent conduct by
rating agencies,297 this plan is posited on the assumption that the
interest of creditors—especially institutional investors—in rating
agency compliance extends well beyond any monetary compensation
as their main priority is preserving their investment. Even receipt of
the full cap of potential liability would likely represent modest
compensation for creditors, compared to the impact on their
investments, yet creditors would still have strong incentives to hold
gatekeepers accountable.
C.

The Incentive Effects of Applying Rating Agency Duties to the
Subprime Debt Context

The subprime mortgage crisis provides a useful backdrop for
thinking about how the implementation of gatekeeper duties could
change the incentives facing rating agencies. Different facets of this
crisis capture each of the critical junctures in which action or inaction
by rating agencies could constitute grossly negligent noncompliance
with material effects on creditors. It is true that any downgrade could
have significance for both issuers and creditors.298 However, the
principal concerns, which were highlighted in the subprime crisis, are
rating downgrades from the highest rating AAA which may trigger
money market funds’ obligations to sell the security, downgrades
297. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability be Based on the Harm
to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 429–31 (1994) (noting
that the logic that a wrongdoer who inflicted an injury should restore victims to their state
prior to the injury is an underlying premise of tort law).
298. See Macey, supra note 174, at 342.
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from investment grade to non-investment grade (whose common
name “junk bond” speaks for itself), and downgrades in the vicinity of
default events where the risk to creditors is the greatest because of
the possibility of nonpayment.299 Timing is a key consideration in
each of these types of rating decisions as inaction by rating agencies
could amount to gross negligence in exposing creditors to risks that
far outstrip the nominal ratings’ risk.
Action and inaction by rating agencies suggest they were grossly
negligent during a number of critical junctures amidst the subprime
mortgage crisis. What is most striking is the role of rating agencies in
legitimizing subprime debt instruments by granting baseless AAA
ratings that qualified the debt for purchase by money market funds,
insurers, and pension funds.300
Rating agencies systematically
incorporated overly-optimistic assumptions into their methodologies,
which in turn allowed individual RMBS and CDO tranches and these
debt instruments as a whole to appear to have much higher ratings
than they merited.301 Erroneous models failed to consider risks in the
underlying mortgage assets or the need for additional information
from issuers.302 The dearth of actual diligence of the underlying
bundles of mortgages may serve as prima facie evidence of gross
negligence in itself, especially in the face of widespread gaming of the
ratings methodologies by issuers to inflate ratings.303 Rating agencies
might reply that it would be unrealistic to expect them to assess
bundles of mortgages one by one. But reasonable sampling of the
actual risk factors involved, coupled with requirements that collateral
appraisers review higher percentages of the underlying mortgages,
would likely have led to different ratings for these debt instruments.
If certification and mandatory reporting requirements had been
in place, rating agencies would have good reason to pause before
rubber stamping subprime debt instruments. The nature of a
certification duty entails affirming that a rating agency engaged in
299. See Hill, supra note 15, at 48–51.
300. See Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 137, at 24–25 (discussing the explosive
growth in the subprime mortgage market and the corresponding dramatic deterioration in
the quality of subprime mortgage debt).
301. See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 2, at 55–60; see also Glover, supra note
143 (noting that “Fitch is acknowledging that it was overly optimistic in its default rate and
other assumptions in its original CDO methodology,” a tacit recognition of the role of its
negligence in the subprime crisis).
302. See Whitehouse, supra note 138 (discussing how the rating agencies’ assumptions
concerning risk led to widespread reliance on erroneous ratings for subprime mortgage
CDOs).
303. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 73–74; see also Sender et al., supra note 140
(discussing banks’ efforts to exploit rating agencies’ lax approach).
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reasonable diligence of disclosures and risk factors that are
reasonably available, actions which the rating agencies simply did not
appear to perform in any meaningful way. The skeptic might say that
the sole difference under a certification requirement would be that
rating agencies would have manufactured a better paper trail to
substantiate that they were not grossly negligent in reviewing
disclosures and in requesting additional information that is sufficient
to support their conclusions. However, requiring rating agencies to
engage in this diligence, coupled with the liability exposure, would
have changed the landscape of incentives and forced rating agencies
to confront the intrinsic risks involved in these instruments at an
earlier point.304 Even modest sampling of risks of the underlying
mortgages would likely have required rating agencies to solicit
additional information from issuers and changed the body of material
information on risk available to both rating agencies and the public.
The institutions that purchased subprime debt instruments would
arguably have the ability to identify grossly negligent acts and
establish loss causation from the lax ratings process.305
The culpability of rating agencies did not end in legitimizing the
design of subprime debt instruments, but rather was underscored by
their grossly negligent inaction as their awareness of both the degree
and magnitude of risks and defaults rose amidst the bubble market.
As incipient evidence of growing risks and even fraud came to light,
rating agencies should have alerted investors of the changing risks,
but instead they held back for months from downgrading RMBS and
CDOs. Rating agencies chose to defer cuts on AAA-rated subprime
debt instruments, even when significant percentages of the portfolio
were in default.306 This fact allowed the holders of the bonds to delay
write offs of significant portions of the loans and facilitated their
continued sales to money market funds, insurance companies, and
other entities restricted to holding high quality assets.307 The
combination of certification and mandatory reporting rules could
easily have altered the rating agencies’ treatment of subprime debt
instruments once the growing evidence of excessive risks and fraud
came to light. Rating agencies would have faced the choice of
opening themselves up to significant liability through inaction or

304. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 356–57.
305. See Sender et al., supra note 140.
306. See Pittman, supra note 144.
307. See Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities
Laws, Exchange Act Release No. 8236, 80 SEC Docket 1003 (June 4, 2003).
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taking measures to alert the investing public of changed
circumstances and downgrading these securities.
The best illustration of these shortcomings is the failure to
downgrade bond insurers MBIA, Inc. (“MBIA”) and Ambac
Assurance Insurance, Inc. (“Ambac”), whose financial guarantees for
subprime debt instruments far outstripped their ability to live up to
their obligations. Rating agencies failed to act on what cursory
diligence would have indicated was necessary even months after the
writing was on the wall, because they feared that downgrades to bond
insurers would automatically cause downgrades of debt insured by
these actors.308 While one could make the case that the SEC or
Federal Reserve needed to bail out the bond insurers to prevent this
chain of events from occurring, this inaction was simply not the rating
agencies’ judgment call to make.309 Certification requirements would
have forced rating agencies to choose at an early point between
willful defiance of their duties to creditors or to downgrade the bond
insurers to reflect the underlying risk exposure. Creditors purchasing
debt whose value was artificially inflated by rating agencies’ inaction
toward bond insurers would have plausible claims that they suffered
injury due to the rating agencies’ gross negligence.
Lastly, the collapse of Bear Stearns provides a window on rating
agency inaction when debt approaches the vicinity of default. Bear
Stearns’ plunge to oblivion occurred in part as a product of its
complicity in producing and marketing subprime debt instruments.310

308. See Harrington & Richard, supra note 146; see also Christine Richard, Ambac’s
Insurance Unit Cut to AA from AAA by Fitch Ratings, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 19, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=asLtTQyLRQQs&refer=home
(noting at the time that Fitch was the sole rating agency to downgrade a AAA bond
insurer, even as Moody’s and S&P declined to do so for Ambac and other AAA-rated
bond insurers).
309. The irony is that Moody’s own implied-ratings group, which provides alternatives
to Moody’s ratings by relying on information such as credit-default swaps, had found that
MBIA and Ambac were junk bonds in significant danger of defaulting on their debts. In
spite of this fact Moody’s continued to grant MBIA and Ambac top ratings to facilitate
their access to capital. See Evans, supra note 157; see also Christine Richard, MBIA,
Ambac Credit Ratings Under Threat at Moody’s, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 4, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aAS6o7QliF8U&refer=home
(noting that Moody’s was finally considering downgrading MBIA and Ambac about a year
after the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis). Almost a year after the subprime
mortgage crisis began, Moody’s finally downgraded MBIA and Ambac from their AAA
rating status. See Stocks Drop as Bank Woes Continue, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/21/business/fi-markets21.
310. See Julia Werdigier & Landon Thomas Jr., HSBC and Bear Stearns Increase Loan
Write-Downs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at C4 (detailing the many problems that helped
contribute to Bear Stearns’ ultimate collapse).
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Both the collapse of the subprime industry and potential liability from
Bear Stearns’ involvement in it were significant factors in the
company’s buyout at a bargain-basement price by J.P. Morgan.311 But
even as the evidence mounted for almost a year that Bear Stearns’
existence could be imperiled due to the scope of its involvement in
the subprime crisis, rating agencies failed to change the ratings to
warn creditors about the imminent risk of default exposure.312 While
the eleventh hour bailout by J.P. Morgan spared creditors exposure to
a Bear Stearns’ default,313 it appears implausible that any paper trail
could support the rating agencies’ inaction in the face of such
mounting risks.
The incentives for proactive monitoring and rating changes
created by a certification duty would at minimum have forced rating
agencies to justify their inaction and to provide reasons why Bear
Stearns’ long-term prospects merited retention of its rating.
Ironically, had rating agencies assumed this role, the collapse of Bear
Stearns might have been prevented as the silence of rating agencies
did nothing to quell fears concerning Bear Stearns’ risk exposure.
Because the buyout averted most of the potential injury to creditors,
these facts fits squarely within the category in which informal SEC
actions may be needed to underscore to rating agencies the scope and
nature of their mandate.
Certification and mandatory reporting duties might not have
prevented the subprime mortgage crisis from arising given the riskseeking behavior that swept over the market. However, these duties
certainly would have given rating agencies reason to pause before
lending their names to legitimize deceptive subprime debt
instruments. These duties would also have provided rating agencies
with incentives to serve as more proactive watchdogs at a much
earlier point in flagging the growing risks in order to save their own
skins and to pop the market bubble.

311. See Landon Thomas Jr. & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JPMorgan Quintuples
Bear Stearns Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at C1.
312. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What Created this Monster?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, § 3 (Business), at 1 (detailing the rating agencies’ inaction in the
face of Bear Stearns’ collapse).
313. See Morgenson, supra note 92 (detailing how Bear Stearns’ bondholders had their
interest preserved through the J.P. Morgan buyout, while Bear Stearns’ shareholders lost
most of their equity stakes).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated how the creation of a user fee
system to finance ratings could transform the landscape of rating
agency accountability. Under the current system rating agencies have
had little reason to take their gatekeeping role seriously and instead
have legitimized excessive risk taking by their nominal principals,
issuers of debt. The creation of an SEC-administered user fee system
offers the potential to reinvigorate gatekeeping roles, to foster
competition and new entrants into the oligopolistic ratings industry,
and to create meaningful oversight roles for the SEC and debt
purchasers. The implementation of certification and mandatory
reporting duties for rating agencies, with capped liability exposure to
creditors limited to cases of gross negligence, will provide a
framework for accountability, yet pose a manageable burden for
rating agencies.
At the moment, policymakers are in “crisis mode” trying to deal
with the fallout from the subprime debt markets, the full scope of
which remains unknown. But this Article suggests that rather than
pointing the finger of blame, policymakers need to look forward and
construct an incentive system for rating agencies that will help ensure
that a crisis of this magnitude does not occur again with rating
agencies asleep at the switch. While the creation of a user fee system
to finance ratings is not a panacea, this Article’s blueprint for change
serves as a foundation for reform of a rapidly changing financial
world in which the need for accurate risk assessments has never been
more clear and pressing.
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